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Harmonizing the Affordable Care Act 
with the Three Main National 
Systems for Healthcare Quality 
Improvement: The Tort, Licensure, 
and Hospital Peer Review Hearing 
Systems 
Katharine Van Tassel† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, an Institute of Medicine report revealed the 
startling news that treatment errors in hospitals were the 
cause of up to 98,000 deaths annually.1 In a recent 2012 update 
on this situation, a Consumer Reports investigation concluded 
that approximately 2.25 million people in the United States 
will likely die from medical harm in the next decade.2 Thus, the 
Institute of Medicine report and the follow-up Consumer 
  
 † Director, Public Health Law & Science Center and Health Law Program, 
Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. M.P.H., Harvard School of Public 
Health; J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.S.N. Case Western 
Reserve University; Author contact information: kvantassel@post.harvard.edu. 
 1 INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
 2 How Safe Is Your Hospital? Our New Ratings Find That Some Are Riskier than 
Others, CONSUMER REPORTS (Aug. 2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/ 
2012/08/how-safe-is-your-hospital/index.htm. (“More than 2.25 million Americans will 
probably die from medical harm this decade . . . . That’s like wiping out the entire 
populations of North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont. It’s a manmade disaster.”). In the 
decade since the IOM Report was published, this situation has not improved. A new study 
by the Department of Health and Human Services estimates that one in seven Medicare 
patients (thirteen and a half percent) experience an adverse event each month in American 
hospitals, and some 15,000 die every month as a result. Deborah Huso, Medical Errors Kill 
15,000 Medicare Patients a Month, DR. HANSEN CHIROPRACTIC (Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://drhansenchiropractic.com/blog/b_3884_medical_errors_kill_15000_medicare_patients__ 
month.html. This makes medical errors in hospitals one of the leading causes of death in 
the nation. A recent Healthgrades study estimates that more than 230,000 hospital deaths 
from 2007 to 2009 could have been prevented within the Medicare population alone. KRISTEN 
REED & RICK MAY, HEALTHGRADES, THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL HEALTHGRADES HOSPITAL 
QUALITY IN AMERICA STUDY 2 (2010), available at http://www.healthgrades.com/business/img/ 
HealthGradesHospitalQualityInAmericaStudy2010.pdf.  
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Reports investigation published over a decade later suggest 
that the three main systems in the United States tasked with 
improving the quality of patient care—the state medical 
malpractice and licensure systems and the private hospital peer 
review hearing system—are all failing at their missions. 
A large and rapidly growing group of empirical studies 
suggests that the current normative practice of custom-based 
medicine in the United States may be partly to blame. Custom-
based medical practice can have a profoundly negative impact 
on the quality and cost of healthcare. This is the same standard 
that the three main U.S. quality improvement systems rely 
upon to measure physician competence. The customary care (or 
eminence-based) model of medical practice is based on 
physician preference grounded in tradition, opinion, or clinical 
experience and not on objective, scientific evidence. 
The quality and cost problems with the customary care 
model of medical practice have led to new national initiatives 
to move the United States to a contemporary, evidence-based 
model of medical practice. These initiatives have led to major 
changes in government-provided healthcare. These changes 
appear in the Veterans Administration (VA) Hospital System, 
Medicare, and in the major new rules governing private 
healthcare insurance sold over Health Benefit Exchanges 
pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 (also known as the ACA or “Obama Care”). The evidence-
based model of medical practice is grounded in empirical data 
created by clinical outcomes and effectiveness research. This 
empirical data can recommend the best treatment for a steadily 
increasing number of clinical disorders. This use of evidence-
based medical practice shows great promise for improving 
quality of care while reducing its cost.3  
This article addresses the question of whether the three 
main systems for improving healthcare quality in the United 
States are following the government’s lead by encouraging the 
adoption of evidence-based medical practice. Unfortunately, the 
short answer is no.  
Reflecting an understanding of the benefits of evidence-
based treatment choices, a minority of state tort systems have 
  
 3 Katharine A. Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due 
Process: Moving from Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical 
Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1179, 1194-97 (2006); see also Ronen 
Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (2009) (advocating this same 
use of CPGs by hospitals but adding a proposal of providing immunity from suit for 
those who apply CPGs).  
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stepped away from using customary care as the exclusive proxy 
for quality of care in medical malpractice actions. These tort 
systems are allowing the introduction of risk–benefit analysis 
grounded in empirical science as evidence of what constitutes 
reasonable care. Thus, this article argues that these minority state 
tort systems are operating instrumentally to encourage the 
transition away from custom-based medical practice and toward 
evidence-based medical practice. By virtue of applying their own 
state law, the state licensure systems of this minority group of 
states will follow suit. On the other hand, the majority of state tort 
systems continue to rely on customary care to measure quality, 
with their licensure systems mirroring this choice. This means 
that the ACA, and other federal programs such as Medicare, are 
on a collision course with the majority of state tort and licensure 
systems over the practice of evidence-based medicine.  
The third major system for improving quality of care is 
the private hospital peer review system. Private hospital peer 
review is a self-policing system where physicians informally 
evaluate each other and sanction those physicians who are 
allegedly failing to provide quality patient care. This article 
asserts that hospital peer review, like the tort and licensure 
systems, encourages the perpetuation of custom-based 
practices and undermines national efforts to improve the 
quality and cost of healthcare through the practice of evidence-
based treatment choices. However, the hospital peer review 
system provides an even stronger disincentive to the adoption 
of evidence-based medicine than the other quality systems 
because the outcome of hospital peer review could be the loss of 
a physician’s entire career.  
Unfortunately, while the ACA has at least some 
provisions addressing the need to make changes in the medical 
malpractice and licensure systems to encourage the use of 
evidence-based standards of care, the ACA completely ignores 
the hospital peer review system. This article makes specific 
suggestions for how to revise all three major systems so that 
they can work in tandem with federal law to encourage 
physicians to adopt the evidence-based model of medical practice 
in order to improve healthcare quality, cost, and access. 
This article starts by explaining the difference between 
customary care treatment choices and evidence-based 
treatment choices. Next, the article explains how customary 
care can be poor quality care, how the customary treatment 
choice of a particular region can be more related to geography 
than to quality, and how customary treatment can be costly 
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treatment. This article then outlines how federally provided 
healthcare pursuant to the ACA, as well as Medicaid and the 
VA Hospital System, have adopted evidence-based treatment 
choices that show great promise for enhancing quality of care 
while decreasing the cost of care. The article goes on to explain 
how the three U.S. systems for improving quality of care—the 
state medical malpractice and licensure systems, and the 
private hospital peer review hearing system—are acting 
instrumentally to thwart national efforts to move to modern, 
evidence-based healthcare. This article accomplishes this by 
citing empirical research and providing a working example of 
how a physician risks medical malpractice liability, or the loss 
of the ability to practice medicine entirely through hospital 
peer review, by choosing the evidence-based treatment choice 
rather than adhering to the customary treatment choice.  
Finally, this article proposes specific solutions to this 
disconnect between federally provided healthcare pursuant to 
the ACA, Medicaid, and the VA Health System, and the other 
three systems for improving health care quality, cost, and 
access. These solutions involve both top-down and bottom-up 
strategies. In the context of the tort and licensure systems, the 
solution is top-down because it requires action on the part of 
state legislatures or court systems. It is up to legislators or 
judges to change the scope of the admissible evidence in medical 
malpractice and licensure cases, either by statute or case law, to 
allow risk–benefit analysis based on empirical evidence to 
become admissible on the issue of the standard of care.  
On the other hand, the solution is bottom-up when it 
comes to hospital peer review. This article proposes that 
hospital peer review be completely restructured through the 
application of a blend of knowledge translation theory with 
continuous quality improvement research. This blended 
approach will put knowledge into action by integrating into 
physician practice evidence-based treatment choices using 
clinical practice guidelines. Relying on the paternalistic 
libertarian theory developed by Professors Cass Sunstein and 
Richard Thaler, this proposed system relies upon “gold 
standard” clinical practice guidelines as the default treatment 
choice, but then allows for individual physician choice in 
deviating from this default choice if it is reasonable to do so. 
This exception allows for the high level of scientific uncertainty 
that exists currently when it comes to many medical 
conditions, particularly in the realm of the treatment of 
outliers. As the practice of evidence-based medicine (also 
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known as population-based medicine or the treatment of 
“norm”) grows through the greater understanding of optimal 
treatment choices through big data techniques to establish 
comparative effectiveness—and later transitions to 
personalized medicine based on the treatment of individuals 
according to their unique genetic profiles—the currently high 
degree of scientific uncertainly will steadily diminish and 
reduce the use of this exception. 
I. THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF CUSTOMARY CARE PRACTICES 
ON THE QUALITY AND COST OF HEALTHCARE 
A. Evidence-Based Versus Custom-Based Care 
As a general matter, customary care is care that would 
customarily be given by other physicians under the same or 
similar circumstances. Customary care is subjective and is 
based on physician preference (grounded on tradition, opinion, 
or clinical experience4) and not on objective, scientific evidence. 
In contrast, the evidence-based model for medical practice is 
grounded on empirical data created through the use of clinical 
outcomes and effectiveness research. This empirical data can 
recommend the best treatment for a steadily increasing 
number of clinical disorders.  
The practice of providing customary care (also referred 
to by many as “eminence-based medicine”) is the normative 
practice in the United States. Unfortunately, a steadily 
growing group of studies demonstrates that many customary 
treatment choices can have a negative impact on the quality of 
care. Another large group of studies indicates that there is a wide 
variation in custom for the same medical condition across the 
country and that the choice of customary treatment can be related 
more to geography than to quality. Finally, there are a rapidly 
mounting number of studies that show the significant negative 
impact of some customary care choices on the cost of healthcare.  
  
 4 See THE IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH & EVALUATION, 
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY-BASED 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AGENCIES 3 (2003), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ 
~iowapic/files/EBP%20Guide%20-%20Revised%205-03.pdf (The Iowa Consortium for 
Substance Abuse Research and Evaluation is based at the University of Iowa).  
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These problems with customary care have, over time, 
become well documented by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health 
Care.5 The Dartmouth Atlas describes itself as follows:  
For more than 20 years, the Dartmouth Atlas Project has 
documented glaring variations in how medical resources are 
distributed and used in the United States. The project uses 
Medicare data to provide information and analysis about 
national, regional, and local markets, as well as hospitals and 
their affiliated physicians. This research has helped 
policymakers, the media, health care analysts and others 
improve their understanding of our health care system and 
forms the foundation for many of the ongoing efforts to 
improve health and health systems across America.6 
In a special report issued by the Dartmouth Atlas 
Project (DAP), three categories of customary care were 
distinguished: failure to provide necessary care, preference-
sensitive care, and supply-sensitive care.7 This article adds an 
additional category: misuse of medical care.  
The DAP defines the first category of customary care as 
the failure to provide needed care.8 The failure to provide 
needed, or necessary, care is referred to in this article as the 
underuse of care. Examples of the types of customary care that 
fall into the category of underuse of care are provided in Part 
  
 5 The Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Dartmouth Atlas].  
The Dartmouth Atlas Project (DAP) began in 1993 as a study of health care markets 
in the United States, measuring variations in health care resources and their 
utilization by both geographic areas. More recently, the research agenda has 
expanded to reporting on the resources and utilization among patients at specific 
hospitals. DAP research uses very large claims databases from the Medicare 
program and other sources to define where Americans seek care, what kind of care 
they receive, and to determine whether increasing investments in health care 
resources and their use result in better health outcomes for Americans. The 
Dartmouth Atlas is a product of the Center for the Evaluative Clinical Sciences at 
Dartmouth Medical School.  
Press Release, Geisel Sch. of Med. at Dartmouth, New Study Shows Need for a Major 
Overhaul of How United States Manages Chronic Illness (May 16, 2006), available at 
http://geiselmed.dartmouth.edu/news/2006_h1/16may2006_overhaul.shtml [hereinafter 
Dartmouth Press Release]. 
 6 Dartmouth Atlas, supra note 5.  
 7 ELLIOT S. FISHER ET AL., REGIONAL AND RACIAL VARIATION IN HEALTH 
CARE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: A BRIEF REPORT OF THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS 
PROJECT 24 (Kristen K. Bronner ed., 2008), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ 
downloads/reports/AF4Q_disparities_Dec2008.pdf. 
 8 Id. The DAP describes effective care as “consist[ing] of evidence-based 
services such as HemoglobinA1c testing for diabetics. Variations in effective care reflect 
failure to deliver needed care.” 
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I.B. Also discussed in Part I.B is the second category of 
customary care: the misuse of medical care. While underuse is 
an omission error, misuse is the wrong choice of medical care 
and therefore represents a commission error.  
The third category of customary care is preference-
sensitive care, which includes care for medical conditions for 
which there are multiple treatment options, each with its own 
benefits and trade-offs.9 The broad geographical variations in 
the use of preference-sensitive customary care, referred to in 
this article as an unwarranted variation in care, are set forth 
in Part I.C.  
The fourth category of customary care is supply-
sensitive care, which represents care for which the supply of a 
specific resource (for example, the number of physicians, 
hospital beds, or specialized testing equipment) heavily 
influences the customary amount of care provided.10 With 
supply-sensitive care, the amount of spending on the same 
condition also varies widely depending on where the patient 
lives.11 Supply-sensitive customary care is also referred to as 
the overuse of medical care in this article. These broad 
variations in the use of medical care are discussed in Part I.D. 
B. Customary Care Can Be Poor Quality Care: Misuse and 
Underuse 
The last several decades of public health research have 
revealed that customary care can actually be “bad” patient 
care. Customary care can lead to misuse and underuse of the 
delivery of healthcare. Misuse occurs when the wrong care is 
provided. Underuse is the failure to deliver necessary 
healthcare; in other words, care for which the benefits clearly 
outweigh the risks.12 
The 1980s brought the first group of studies that 
revealed that many customary treatment choices resulted in 
the misuse of healthcare. These studies exposed “serious 
weaknesses in the scientific underpinnings of many customary 
practices.”13 For example, the use of certain respiratory 
  
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See id. 
 12 Minal S. Kale et al., Trends in the Overuse of Ambulatory Health Care 
Services in the United States, ARCH. INTERN. MED. E1, E1-E2 (2012). 
 13 Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing 
Physician Liability, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 88-89 & n.6 (1991) (citing, for 
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techniques and gastric freezing of ulcers, which were quickly 
adopted as “standard practice,” were ultimately discredited by 
scientific studies.14 More recently, the practice of prescribing a 
choice among a broad array of antibiotics for uncomplicated 
urinary tract infections was identified as misuse—only the 
prescription of nitrofurantoin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, 
or quinolone is appropriate.15 Another study disclosed that 
medications are customarily misused in elderly patients 7.2% 
of the time.16 Other common practices that have been 
discredited are the routine use of antiarrhythmic drugs for all 
patients with irregular heartbeats after a heart attack17 and the 
long-held, but erroneous, belief that hormone replacement 
therapy prevents heart disease in women.18 It has also been 
established that lumbar discectomy, the most common surgical 
treatment for those with back and leg pain, is largely 
unnecessary.19 And in 2011, a study was published that 
  
example, David M. Eddy & John Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence: 
Implications for Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988, at 19, 20 (“For at least 
some important practices, the existing evidence is of such poor quality that it is 
virtually impossible to determine even what effect the practice has on patients, much 
less whether that effect is preferable to the outcomes that would have occurred with 
other options.”)); David M. Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice, 
307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 343, 343 (1982) (“[T]here is reason to believe that there are 
flaws in the process by which the profession generates clinical policies.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 13, at 88-89 & n.6; Eddy, supra note 13, at 343.  
 15 Kale et al., supra note 12, at E1-E2 (“[U]se of antibiotics other than 
nitrofurantoin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole or quinolone” is the incorrect treatment 
for “uncomplicated urinary tract infections.”). 
 16 Id. at E5. 
 17 Christine Gorman, Are Doctors Just Playing Hunches, TIME (Feb. 15, 
2007), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1590448,00.html. The long-
followed, customary practice of physicians has been to prescribe antiarrhythmia drugs 
to every patient who experiences irregular heartbeats after a heart attack. Id. A 
surprising study showed that patients with only mild arrhythmias are more likely to 
die if they take antiarrhythmia drugs. Id. Based on this empirical evidence, some 
physicians have modified their practice and adopted the evidence-based choice, and 
give the medication only to those with severe cardiac arrhythmias post heart attack. 
Id. But some still have not. Id.  
 18 Mark A. Hlatky et al., Quality-of-Life and Depressive Symptoms in 
Postmenopausal Women After Receiving Hormone Therapy: Results From the Heart and 
Estrogen/Progestin Replacement Study (HERS) Trial, 287 JAMA 591, 591 (2002) 
(finding that in 2763 postmenopausal women with pre-existing coronary artery disease 
who were randomly assigned to take either estrogen/progestin HRT or a placebo, 
researchers found no overall reduction in the rate of coronary heart disease events 
among the women receiving HRT compared to those receiving the placebo). This new 
reality altered the risk-benefit calculus that was formerly used to recommend hormone 
replacement therapy to tens of thousands of women. See generally id. 
 19 James N. Weinstein et al., Surgical v. Non-Operative Treatment for 
Lumbar Disc Herniation, 296 JAMA 2441, 2445, 2447 (2006). Those who had surgery 
and those who were provided with more conservative treatment, such as physical 
therapy, reached the same level of recovery. Id.  
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estimated that the choice to surgically implant cardioverter-
defibrillators (ICDs) was incorrect 20%–40% of the time.20  
On the other hand, a large group of physicians stick to 
customary practices of not providing important medical care, 
even in the face of empirical evidence that those treatments 
would greatly benefit their patients, in many cases placing 
their patients at a significantly increased risk of death. These 
customs represent underuse of healthcare.21 A major study was 
released in 200522 that surprised many. This study uncovered 
the unfortunate failure of both physicians and hospitals to 
provide treatments that were essential for saving the lives of 
those who suffered from the most common causes of death—
pneumonia, heart attack, and heart failure.23  
A major study published on December 24, 2012, 
suggests that there has been little improvement on the part of 
individual physicians in this underuse problem in the seven 
years since the 2005 study.24 For example, physicians fail to 
provide antithrombotic treatment for atrial fibrillation 28.1% of 
the time.25 This treatment, when provided, decreases the risk of 
stroke for these patients.26 Physicians fail to provide aspirin 
35.5% of the time, beta-blockers 44.8% of the time, and statins 
41.4% of the time for patients with coronary heart disease.27 
Aspirin reduces the occurrence of vascular events in patients 
with coronary artery disease, including myocardial infarction 
  
 20 Sana M. Al-Khatib et al., Non-Evidence-Based ICD Implantations in the 
United States, 305 JAMA 43, 43 (2011). The use of implantable cardioverter-
defibrillators (ICDs) can prevent sudden cardiac death. Id. In the study, over 20% of 
patients were given surgically implanted ICDs inappropriately. Id. at 45. The 
percentage of inappropriate implantation of ICDs was as high as 40%. Id. at 48.  
 21 See Kale et al., supra note 12, at E1.  
 22 Ashish K. Jha et al., Care in U.S. Hospitals—The Hospital Quality Alliance 
Program, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 265, 265 (2005). 
 23 See Ford Fessenden, It’s the Simple Things, but Some Hospitals Don’t Do 
Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, § 4, at 43, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
learning/teachers/featured_articles/20050822monday.html. For example, patients who 
are prescribed aspirin within the first twenty-four hours after a heart attack have up to 
a thirty percent improvement in their rate of survival. Id. However, many physicians 
fail to provide this very simple, life-saving treatment.  
 24 Kale et al., supra note 12. 
 25 Id. at E2.  
 26 N.A. Mark Estes III et al., ACC/AHA/Physician Consortium 2008 Clinical 
Performance Measures for Adults With Nonvalvular Atrial Fibrillation or Atrial 
Flutter: A Report of the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association 
Task Force on Performance Measures and the Physician Consortium for Performance 
Improvement (Writing Committee to Develop Clinical Performance Measures for Atrial 
Fibrillation), 117 CIRCULATION 1101-20 (2008), available at http://circ.ahajournals.org/ 
content/117/8/1101.full.pdf+html (“Atrial fibrillation is associated with an increased risk 
of stroke, heart failure, and all-cause mortality, especially in women.”).  
 27 Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2. 
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and death.28 Failure to prescribe beta-blockers “can be 
associated with a broad range of adverse outcomes, including 
all-cause and cardiovascular mortality, cardiovascular 
hospitalizations, and the need for revascularization 
procedures.”29 “The use of statins reduces [the] risk of 
cardiovascular events.”30 
Physicians also fail to provide beta-blockers in patients 
with congestive heart failure 40.3% of the time31 (beta-blockers 
improve symptoms and significantly improve mortality32) and 
fail to use statins in patients with diabetes mellitus 63.8% of 
the time33 (statins produce a 19%–55% reduction in cardio-
vascular disease events in patients with diabetes mellitus—a 
major cause of mortality).34 In addition, there is a failure by 
physicians to use ACE inhibitors in congestive heart failure 
58.4% of the time. ACE inhibitors, combined with standard 
treatment, slow the progression of heart failure in patients 
with mild symptoms, and their use has shown “beneficial 
effects on mortality, morbidity, and quality of life.”35 Finally, 
physicians fail to use antiplatelets in stroke patients 51.3% of 
the time (antiplatelets significantly decrease risk of secondary 
stroke, myocardial infarction, and death36) and fail to use the 
pharmacologic treatment of osteoporosis 54.9% of the time37 
  
 28 AM. COLL. OF CARDIOLOGY FOUND. ET AL., CHRONIC STABLE CORONARY 
ARTERY DISEASE: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SET 55 (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/pcpi/cadminisetjune06.pdf.  
 29 Id. at 61. 
 30 Id. at 29. 
 31 Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2. 
 32 William E. Chavey II, The Importance of Beta Blockers in the Treatment of 
Heart Failure, 1 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 2453, 2453-62 (2000), available at http://www.aafp.org/ 
afp/2000/1201/p2453.html.  
 33 Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2. 
 34 John Buse, Statin Treatment in Diabetes Mellitus, 21 CLINICAL DIABETES 168, 
171 (2003).  
Since the 1970s, there have been substantial epidemiological data demonstrating 
that cardiovascular diseases (here defined as inschemic heart disease, stroke, and 
peripheral vascular disease) constitute the primary cause of morbidity and mortality 
in patients with diabetes. In fact, at least 60% and arguably 80% of people with 
diabetes will eventually succumb to cardiovascular disease (CVD).  
Id. at 168. 
 35 M.K. Davies et al., ABC of Heart Failure Management: Diuretics, ACE 
Inhibitors, and Nitrates, 320 BMJ 428, 429 (2000). 
 36 Dawn Meyer, Antiplatelets and Stroke Outcomes: State of the Science, 21 
CRIT. CARE NURS. CLIN. N. AM. 517-28 (2009). 
 37 Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2. 
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(pharmacologic treatment can “prevent fractures in men and 
women with low bone density or osteoporosis”38). 
All of these studies, taken together, demonstrate that 
following customary care can actually negatively impact 
quality of care by either suggesting that a physician provide the 
wrong treatment or fail to provide a lifesaving treatment. Thus, 
following customary care may mean that a patient’s condition 
may not only fail to improve, it may worsen, while also exposing 
that patient to unnecessary risks, long-term disability, or death. 
C. Customary Care Is Related More to Location than to 
Quality: Unwarranted Variation 
In the 1980s, an entirely separate series of surprising 
empirical studies raised the question of whether patients 
receive very different care depending on where they live, 
suggesting that customary care might have a stronger link to 
geography than to quality.39 It appeared from these studies that 
the choices physicians make when treating the identical 
clinical conditions vary widely from region to region.40 These 
  
 38 Amir Qaseem et al., Pharmacologic Treatment of Low Bone Density or 
Osteoporosis to Prevent Fractures: A Clinical Practice Guideline from the American 
College of Physicians, 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 404, 405 (2008).  
 39 See generally John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in 
Health Care Delivery, 182 SCI. 1102 (1973) [hereinafter Wennberg I]; John E. 
Wennberg et al., Professional Uncertainty and the Problem of Supplier-Induced 
Demand, 16 SOC. SCI. MED. 811, 812-17 (1982) [hereinafter Wennberg et al., 
Professional Uncertainty] (detailing differences in surgical practices); John E. 
Wennberg, Dealing With Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal For Action, HEALTH 
AFF., Summer 1984, at 6, 7 [hereinafter Wennberg II] (variations in surgical 
procedures and medical treatments were documented); David M. Eddy, Variations in 
Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1984, at 74, 77-80 
(detailing physician variations in choice of diagnosis and of procedure); Mark R. 
Chassin et al., Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical Services by the Medicare 
Population, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285, 287 (1986) (measuring variation in rates of use 
by Medicare beneficiaries). 
 40 See generally Wennberg I, supra note 39. For example,  
In Maine, by the time women reach seventy years of age in one hospital market the 
likelihood they have undergone a hysterectomy is 20 percent while in another 
market it is 70 percent. In Iowa, the chances that male residents who reach age 
eighty five have undergone prostatectomy range from a low of 15 percent to a high of 
more than 60 percent in different hospital markets. In Vermont, the probability that 
resident children will undergo a tonsillectomy has ranged from a low of 8 percent in 
one hospital market to a high of 70 percent in another. 
Id. at 9; see also Mark A. Hall & Michael D. Green, Introduction, 37 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 663, 670-71 (2002) (citing Bruce E. Landon et al., Personal, Organizational, and 
Market Level Influences on Physician Practice Patterns: Results of a National Survey of 
Primary Care Physicians, 39 MED. CARE 889, 889 (2001) (failing to find, through the 
use of clinical vignettes, any evidence of “a consistent practice style” for certain 
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studies prompted the creation of The Dartmouth Atlas of 
Health Care so that these issues could be intensely 
investigated.41 The Dartmouth Atlas Project (DAP) has 
confirmed what the initial studies suggested: there is a wide 
variation of treatments for the same condition from region to 
region across the entire United States.42  
For example, a patient is five times more likely to be 
treated with a lower extremity bypass if that patient lives in 
Baltimore, Maryland than if that patient lives in Temple, Texas. 
Patients with prostate cancer are three times more likely to be 
treated with a radical prostatectomy if they live in Salt Lake 
City, Utah than if they live in San Francisco, California.43 
An infrequent, but devastating, complication of diabetes 
and peripheral vascular disease is amputation. A patient’s 
chances of leg amputation can change by a factor of ten 
depending on where that patient lives.44 Other examples 
include the rates of hip, knee, and shoulder replacements. A 
patient who lives in Ogden, Utah is four times more likely to 
receive a hip replacement than a patient who lives in Bryan, 
Texas.45 Similarly, a patient living in Lincoln, Nebraska is 
almost four times more likely to receive a knee replacement than 
a patient living in New York, New York.46 And a patient living in 
  
common discretionary medical decisions)); see also James F. Blumstein, The Legal 
Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing In Assuring Quality, Accounting for Costs, and 
Coping with an Evolving Reality In The Health Care Marketplace, 11 ANNALS HEALTH 
L. 125, 137 (2002) (Thus, “to ask an expert . . . what the ‘customary practice’ is [for a 
particular condition] on a national basis . . . is to ask a question to which there cannot 
be, for many diagnosis and treatment decisions, a coherent answer.”). 
 41 Dartmouth Atlas, supra note 5.  
 42 See CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SCI., DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH 
CARE: STUDIES OF SURGICAL VARIATION SPINE SURGERY, available at 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Spine_Surgery_2006.pdf (last updated 
Apr. 15, 2010). For example, a patient is twenty times more likely to have surgery if that 
patient lives in Idaho Falls, Missoula, or Mason City than if that patient lives in 
Newark, Bangor, or Terre Haute. Id. at 7. Other examples: A patient living in 
Bradenton, Florida is seventy-five percent more likely to have spinal surgery than a 
patient living in Tampa, Florida, id., and a patient is fifty percent more likely to have 
hip surgery if that patient lives in Fort Lauderdale than in neighboring Miami, ELLIOTT 
S. FISHER ET AL., TRENDS AND REGIONAL VARIATION IN HIP, KNEE, AND SHOULDER 
REPLACEMENT 17 (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ 
downloads/reports/Joint_Replacement_0410.pdf. 
 43 ANITA ARORA ET AL., WHAT KIND OF PHYSICIAN WILL YOU BE? VARIATION IN 
HEALTH CARE AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR RESIDENCY TRAINING 10 (Oct. 30, 2012), available 
at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Residency_report_103012.pdf. 
 44 Philip P. Goodney et al., Variation in the Use of Lower Extremity Vascular 
Procedures for Critical Limb Ischemia, 5 CIRC. CARDIOVASC. QUAL. OUTCOMES 1, 2 
(2012), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3281555/. 
 45 FISHER ET AL., supra note 42, at 6.  
 46 Id. at 8. 
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Provo, Utah is ten times more likely to receive a shoulder 
replacement than someone living in Syracuse, New York.47 
Another study demonstrated that the amount and type 
of care for chronically ill patients at the end of life differed 
greatly at academic medical centers located in different regions 
across the country.48 The authors point out that “[t]he degree of 
variation . . . suggests . . . that patients are receiving care and 
resident physicians are receiving training that reflects the local 
practice style of their teaching hospital.”49 
These studies indicate that what constitutes customary 
care can be based on physician preferences (referred to in one 
major study as “local practice style[s]”50) unlinked from best 
practices and that these preferences can be highly dependent on 
the region in which the physician practices.  
D. Customary Care Can Be Costly Healthcare: Overuse  
Customary care can also result in overuse of healthcare. 
Of the estimated $700 billion wasted every year by the U.S. 
healthcare system, “over use, or the delivery of services for 
which the risks exceed the benefits, has been identified as a 
significant component, equaling roughly 280 billion.”51 Overall, 
“[r]esearch on appropriateness indicates that from one quarter 
to one third of medical services may be of no value to 
patients.”52 For example, 11.3% of screening EKGs, 25.3% of 
screening urine analyses, 7.0% of screening x-rays, and 37.9% 
of complete blood counts are unnecessarily ordered as part of a 
general medical exam.53 Antibiotics are unnecessarily 
prescribed for upper respiratory tract infections 40.2% of the 
time, for acute bronchitis 58.8% of the time, and for asthma 
6.8% of the time.54  
A 2012 study from the Stanford University School of 
Medicine revealed that an invasive heart test, used routinely to 
  
 47 Id. at 10.  
 48 ARORA ET AL., supra note 43, at 7.  
 49 Id.  
 50 Id.  
 51 Kale et al., supra note 12, at E2 (citing THOMSON REUTERS, WHERE CAN 
$700 BILLION IN WASTE BE CUT ANNUALLY FROM THE US HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM? 
(2009), available at https://healthleadersmedia.com/content/241965.pdf). 
 52 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 7-1, at 34 (5th ed. 2004) 
(citing Robert Brook & Kathleen Lohr, Will We Need to Ration Effective Medical Care?, 
3 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., no. 1, at 68 (Fall 1986)). 
 53 Kale et al., supra note 12, at E5. 
 54 Id.  
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measure heart function, is being dramatically overused.55 This 
test is called a left ventriculography, or left ventriculogram, 
and it measures the percentage of blood that gets squeezed out 
with each heartbeat for a cost of $300.56 Out of 37,000 Aetna 
patients studied who underwent this test in 2007, 88% had 
already received another, more effective test that provided the 
same (and in many cases, better) data to the physician.57 These 
patients received the left ventriculogram test inappropriately, 
exposing them to the risks of side effects from injecting the dye, 
increased radiation exposure, and an increased risk of heart 
arrhythmias and stroke with no resulting benefit,58 wasting 
$976,800 in just this one group of patients in one year. 
The DAP suggests that much of this overuse occurs 
because these are supply-sensitive services. The care of 
chronically ill, elderly patients provides a good example of how 
these supply-sensitive services lead to overuse.59 Popular, 
customary belief is  
  
 55 Ronald M. Witteles et al., Use and Overuse of Left Ventriculography, 163 
AM. HEART J. 617 (2012).  
 56 Invasive Heart Test Being Dramatically Overused, Study Shows, 
SCIENCEDAILY (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/04/ 
120406234519.htm. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. In 2011, the National Physicians Alliance through its Good 
Stewardship project identified the top five overused ambulatory care practices in 
internal medicine, family medicine and pediatrics and then began a campaign to 
educate physicians in how to avoid these overuses. Good Stewardship Working Grp., 
The “Top 5” Lists in Primary Care: Meeting the Responsibility of Professionalism, 171 
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1385-90 (2011). The “Choosing Wisely” campaign was started the 
following year by the American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation in coordination 
with nine physician specialty groups to identify tests or procedures that are commonly 
used but are not always appropriate. Choosing Wisely: An Initiative of the ABIM 
Foundation, http://choosingwisely.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
 59 Dartmouth Press Release, supra note 4 (press release summarizing the 
study findings: “Almost One-Third of Medicare Spending for Chronically Ill 
Unnecessary, According to Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care; Improving Care Could 
Also Lower Costs”) (referring to ELLIOT FISHER ET AL., THE CARE OF PATIENTS WITH 
SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS: AN ONLINE REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM BY THE 
DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT (2006), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ 
downloads/atlases/2006_Chronic_Care_Atlas.pdf). This  
Dartmouth Atlas Project studied the records of 4.7 million Medicare enrollees who 
died from 2000 to 2003 and had at least one of 12 chronic illnesses. The study 
demonstrates that even within this limited patient population, Medicare could have 
realized substantial savings—$40 billion or nearly one-third of what it spent for 
their care over the four years—if all U.S. hospitals practiced at the high-quality/low-
cost standard set by the Salt Lake City region. The report comes on the heels of a 
report by Medicare’s trustees that the insurance program will exhaust its trust fund 
in 2018, two years earlier than previously forecast.  
Dartmouth Press Release, supra note 4.  
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that more services—that is, using every available resource such as 
specialists, hospital and ICU beds, diagnostic tests and imaging 
etc.—produces better outcomes. Based on this assumption, the 
supply of resources—not the incidence of illness—drives utilization 
of the services. In effect, the supply of hospital beds, ICU beds, and 
specialty physicians creates its own demand, so areas with more 
resources per capita have higher costs per capita.60 
One of the DAP’s groundbreaking studies released in 2006 
investigating the amount of care provided to chronically ill, 
elderly patients reviewed data from the top academic medical 
centers in the country and discovered that  
the average number of hospitalized days during the last six months 
of life ranged from 12.9 days per decedent at St. Mary’s Hospital (the 
principal hospital of the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minn.) to 23.9 at 
New York-Presbyterian Hospital. The University of California at Los 
Angeles teaching hospital had the highest average number of days in 
intensive care units during the last six months of life (11.4 days per 
decedent), a rate 3.5 times higher than the rate for patients treated 
at the University of California teaching hospital in San Francisco 
(3.3 days per decedent). Medicare enrollees who were patients of the 
New York University Medical Center had an average of 76.2 
physician visits during their last six months of life, almost one-third 
more than patients at the next-highest rate academic medical center, 
the Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital (57.7 visits per 
decedent). Patients of the University of Kentucky Hospital had 
slightly more than half as many (18.6) physician visits as the 
national average (33.5).61 
Importantly, the study debunked the “‘more is better’ 
myth in health care,” as hospitals that provided more intensive 
care and spent more did not get better results.62 On the other 
  
 60 Dartmouth Press Release, supra note 4.  
The financial incentives used by Medicare and most other payers encourage the 
overuse of acute care hospital services and the proliferation of medical specialists. 
The care of people with chronic illness accounts for more than 75 percent of all U.S. 
health care expenditures, indicating that overuse and overspending is not just a 
Medicare problem—the health care system as a whole has not developed efficient, 
effective ways of caring for people with severe chronic illnesses.  
Id.  
 61 Id.  
 62 Id.  
The researchers studied patients with chronic illnesses because about 30 to 35 
percent of Medicare dollars are spent on people with these conditions during the last 
two years of their lives. Two-thirds of those in the study were diagnosed with cancer, 
congestive heart failure and/or chronic lung disease. “The majority of acute care 
hospitals are applying their standard forms of ‘rescue medicine’ to people who are 
in advanced stages of diseases that can’t be cured,” said Wennberg. “Patients 
don’t benefit—they can’t be rescued—and the costs of such care are very high, 
both in dollars spent and in providing care that the majority of chronically-ill 
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hand, those “with the best quality and [best] outcomes used far 
fewer resources.”63 For example, “[p]atients in low-cost, high-
quality regions such as Salt Lake City, Utah, Rochester, Minn., 
and Portland, Ore., are admitted less frequently to hospitals, 
spend less time in intensive care units and see fewer 
specialists.”64 What this demonstrates is that the hospitals that 
are making low-cost choices are not withholding needed care.65 
They are simply more efficient by providing better outcomes 
while using fewer resources.66 The authors of the study 
recommend that “[t]hese organizations offer a benchmark of 
performance toward which other systems should strive.”67 This 
study agreed with other estimates that 30%–35% of the cost of 
Medicare could be saved if the overuse generated by regional 
customs was avoided.68  
In a recent New Yorker article on the issue of the 
overuse of medical services, Harvard Professor Atul Gawande 
examined the reasons that McAllen, Texas is one of the most 
expensive markets in the country, second only to Miami, 
Florida.69 He opined that “[t]he cause of McAllen’s extreme costs 
was, very simply, across-the-board overuse of medicine.” In his 
article, Professor Gawande pointed out that Medicare spends 
two times the national average on Medicare enrollees in 
McAllen. This totaled fifteen thousand dollars per patient, per 
year.70 He observed that,  
[b]etween 2001 and 2005, critically ill Medicare patients received 
almost fifty percent more specialist visits in McAllen than in El 
Paso, and were two-thirds more likely to see ten or more specialists 
in a six month period. In 2005 and 2006, patients in McAllen 
received twenty percent more abdominal ultrasounds, thirty percent 
more bone-density studies, sixty percent more nerve-conduction 
studies to diagnose carpal-tunnel syndrome, and five hundred and 
fifty percent more urine-flow studies to diagnose prostate troubles. 
They received one-fifth to two-thirds more gall bladder operations, 
knee replacements, breast biopsies, and bladder scopes. They 
  
patients might not want, such as admissions to intensive care and being sent to 
specialist after specialist.”  
Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id.  
 67 Id. 
 68 See id.  
 69 Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?currentPage=all.  
 70 Id.  
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received two to three times as many pacemakers, implantable 
defibrillators, cardiac-bypass operations, carotid endartectomies, and 
coronary artery stents. And Medicare paid for five times as many 
home-nurse visits.71  
And yet, compared to neighboring El Paso, a similar 
community, the hospitals in McAllen did not provide better 
quality of care.72 On the twenty-five metrics that Medicare uses 
to measure quality, El Paso performed better than McAllen on 
each metric.73 Importantly, a patient is exposed to unnecessary 
risk each time that patient has an unwarranted invasive test 
or surgery. These risks could include the possibility of physical 
disability or death. 
II. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS PROVIDING HEALTHCARE 
HAVE ADOPTED EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE 
A. Veterans Administration Hospitals, Medicare, and 
Medicaid 
The quality and cost problems with the customary care 
model have led to new national initiatives to move the United 
States toward a modern, evidence-based model of medical 
practice through major changes in government-provided 
healthcare. Together, government programs provide healthcare 
for over 80 million people.74 The VA Hospital System is a good 
example of a system that works well in coordinating care and 
improving outcomes through evidence-based medicine.75 The 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has also taken 
steps through Medicare to encourage healthcare providers to use 
  
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Health insurance is now primarily provided by the government in the 
public sector, with 60-65% of healthcare provision and spending coming from programs 
such as Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and 
the Veterans Health Administration. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 
(2008). Before ACA, around 84.7% of Americans had some form of health insurance; 
either through their employer or the employer of their spouse or parent (59.3%), 
purchased individually (8.9%), or provided by government programs (27.8%; there is 
some overlap in these figures). All government health care programs have restricted 
eligibility, and there is no government health insurance company which covers all 
Americans. Before ACA, Americans without health insurance coverage totaled 15.3% of 
the population, or 45.7 million people. Id. 
 75 PHILLIP LONGMAN, BEST CARE ANYWHERE: WHY VA HEALTH CARE IS BETTER 
THAN YOURS 1-10 (2007) (describing the VA system and its practice of evidence-based 
medicine resulting in well-coordinated care that results in good outcomes). 
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best practices grounded in evidence-based guidelines to improve 
outcomes through several major programs.76  
The first program adopted by CMS that focuses on best 
practices deals with “never events.” Never events are 
preventable medical errors that would not occur if best 
practices were followed.77 Oddly enough, before the never 
events initiative, healthcare providers could bill for the 
additional services required to treat patients for the injuries 
caused by these mistakes.78 These additional payments 
amounted to a bonus for bad patient care. Under the never 
events approach, CMS will not reimburse healthcare providers 
for these costs, forcing the healthcare providers to bear the cost 
of their mistakes79 and encouraging the adoption of best 
practices to avoid making them. This program also requires 
that hospitals report never events to state officials to allow for 
outcome tracking. The public shaming that comes with 
publishing this data also encourages best practices to avoid 
  
 76 For a detailed overview of these quality of care measures, see JAMES T. 
O’REILLY, HEALTHCARE RULEMAKING GUIDE: ADMINISTRATIVE RULES IMPLEMENTING 
THE NEW HEALTH CARE LAWS (2012) (a treatise on all of the provisions in ACA), and 
Barry Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
159 U. PENN. L. REV. 1727, 1737 (2011) (providing an overview of the quality of care 
provisions contained in both ACA and other government provided healthcare programs). 
 77 The concept of “never events” was first developed by the National Quality 
Forum (NQF) to describe gross medical errors, “errors in medical care that are clearly 
identifiable, preventable, and serious in their consequences for patients, and that 
indicate a real problem in the safety and credibility of a health care facility.” Press 
Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Eliminating Serious, Preventable, and 
Costly Medical Errors—Never Events (May 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1863; Agency for 
Healthcare Research & Quality, Patient Safety Primers, http://www.psnet.ahrq.gov/ 
primer.aspx?primerID=3 (last visited on Mar. 29, 2013) (“The term ‘Never Event’ was 
first introduced in 2001 by Ken Kizer, MD, former CEO of the National Quality Forum 
(NQF), in reference to particularly shocking medical errors (such as wrong-site 
surgery) that should never occur.”). Some examples of never events are: “surgery on the 
wrong body part; foreign body left in a patient after surgery; mismatched blood 
transfusion; major medication error; severe ‘pressure ulcer’ acquired in the hospital; 
and preventable post-operative deaths.” Id. A reporting requirement for “never events” 
has been adopted by over twenty states. These reporting requirements force providers 
to disclose adverse outcomes to the appropriate state department, with the goal of 
improving their operations. Id. 
 78 Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human: 
What Have We Learned, 293 JAMA 2384, 2388 (2005). 
 79 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. FISCAL YEAR 2009 QUALITY MEASURE 
REPORTING FOR 2010 PAYMENT UPDATE, available at http://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/ 
downloads/HospitalRHQDAPU200808.pdf.  
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errors.80 As a follow-on program, CMS also recently began to 
refuse reimbursement for hospital-acquired infections.81  
A second program, the Premier Quality Initiative, 
started in 2002 when CMS began ranking hospitals by 
performance, based on patient outcomes that can be positively 
affected by the adoption of best practices.82 Depending on a 
hospital’s ranking, it can receive a bonus or a reduced 
payment.83 This program includes a reporting incentive by 
giving those hospitals that report certain quality data a higher 
annual increase in their payment rates. This data is then used 
to rank participating hospitals,84 and these rankings are 
available on the consumer-friendly Hospital Compare website.85 
Consumers can decide which hospital to use to decrease their 
risk of death or complications from, for example, a particular 
surgical procedure. Finally, CMS has issued a proposed rule86 to 
integrate overall patient experience of care into its reward 
system.87 This gives weight to the goal of establishing patient-
centered care by giving patients a place at the table so their 
voices can be heard. Hospitals that score well in both quality of 
care provided and patient experience of care would receive 
higher payments under this proposed rule.88  
A third program, the Physician Quality Reporting 
System (PQRS), is targeted at physicians and provides 
  
 80 Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 77. 
 81 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid—CMS, PREMIER, http://www.premierinc.com/ 
quality-safety/tools-services/safety/topics/guidelines/cms-guidelines-4-infection.jsp (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2013).  
 82 ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, REWARDING SUPERIOR QUALITY CARE: THE 
PREMIER HOSPITAL QUALITY INCENTIVE DEMONSTRATION: CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVICES FACT SHEET (2006), available at http://www.allhealth.org/ 
BriefingMaterials/HospitalPremierFS200602-175.pdf (outlining the methods used to 
score and rank hospitals based on quality measures); see also Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, https://www.cms.gov/ 
Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/HospitalQualityInits/ 
HospitalPremier.html (last updated Jan. 9, 2013, 9:25 AM) (same, along with setting 
forth some of the results of the project). 
 83 ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, supra note 82.  
 84 Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Updates the 
National Hospital Quality Measure Acute Myocardial Infarction Set for Discharges as 
of April 1, 2009 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/ 
Downloads/HospitalAMI-6FactSheet.pdf. 
 85 Hospital Compare, MEDICARE, http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/ 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013).  
 86 Hospital Inpatient Value-Based Purchasing Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 2454 
(proposed Jan. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422 and 480).  
 87 Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Affordable Care Act 
to Improve Hospital Care for Patients (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/ 
apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=3893. 
 88 Id.  
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increased reimbursement for physicians who report 
information on quality measures. These measures are focused 
on patient outcomes for services covered by the Physician Fee 
Schedule under Medicare Part B.89 PQRS was expanded in 2011 
to add twenty new reporting measures. Starting in 2015, 
physicians will be docked for failing to report data on patient 
outcomes.90 Of special interest is the bonus that physicians 
received starting in 2011 for writing prescriptions 
electronically.91 In 2012, physicians who fail to do so will have 
their reimbursements docked.92 The goal of this initiative is to 
prevent the millions of medication errors that occur in the 
United States every year. It also will provide the ability to 
track the prescription practices of physicians. 
B. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(the ACA) was signed into law by President Obama on March 
23, 2010.93 Almost all of the press to date has focused on the 
ACA’s goal of improving access to health care by increasing the 
number of people who qualify for Medicaid and by changing the 
private insurance market with the advent of the individual 
mandate. However, improving the quality and cost of 
healthcare is also a major goal of the Act. There are several 
major initiatives contained in the ACA that reflect this goal 
and which all work to encourage the practice of evidence-based 
medicine by building on the already strong CMS efforts 
described in the previous section.  
Importantly, in conjunction with the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act),94 the ACA 
  
 89 The Medicare Improvements and Extension Act of 2006, sec. 101(b), § 1848, 
120 Stat. 2975, 2975-77, established the PQRS. The PQRS was originally called the PQRI 
(Physician Quality Reporting Initiative). Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., Physician Quality Reporting System and E-Prescribing Program (Nov. 3, 2010), 
available at http://www.cms.gov/apps/media/press/factsheet.asp?Counter=3858. 
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in 
scattered sections of Titles 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 of the United States Code).  
 94 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit. 
VIII, 123 Stat. 115, 175-77 (2009); see also Comparative Effectiveness Research 
Funding, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/index.html (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2013) (showing research funding allocation among government entities). The 
Recovery Act created the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness 
Research to organize such research across the federal government. Recovery Act § 804, 
123 Stat. at 187-88; reflected in 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8.  
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will be providing hundreds of millions of dollars of funding for 
research to develop evidence-based clinical practice guidelines 
that will be used to define the best practices that the Act 
promotes.95 For example, under § 10303 of the ACA, these best 
practices96 will be used to create more of the same types of 
patient outcome measures that are already being utilized in 
Medicare.97 The ACA creates a new oversight entity, the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research (PCOR) Institute, to 
direct the Comparative Effectiveness Program that will create 
data banks98 comparing the effectiveness of two or more 
treatments.99 These databanks will provide much needed 
  
 95 See, e.g., 123 Stat. at 176-78.  
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has opportunities under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) to provide 
patients, clinicians, and others evidence-based information to make informed 
decisions about health care. The Recovery Act contains $1.1 billion for comparative 
effectiveness research. Of the total, $300 million is for AHRQ to build on its existing 
collaborative and transparent Effective Health Care program.  
AHRQ and the Recovery Act, http://www.ahrq.gov/fund/cefarra.htm (last updated Nov. 
2011). The National Guideline Clearinghouse is sponsored by the ARHQ. The National 
Guideline Clearinghouse reviews all clinical practice guidelines for the quality of the 
evidence supporting them. NAT’L GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.guideline.gov/ 
about/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2012) (providing a “public resource for evidence 
based clinical practice guidelines”). 
 96 Section 6301 mandates patient-centered outcomes research as a part of the 
larger goal of developing comparative clinical effectiveness research (CER). The section 
defines “comparative clinical effectiveness research” to mean “research evaluating and 
comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or 
more medical treatments [and] services . . . .” Recovery Act § 1181(a)(2)(A). ACA 
further defines medical treatments and services broadly, to include the provision of 
care as well as the use of medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and “integrative health 
practices.” Id. § 1181(a)(2)(B). CER is well funded, with $1.1 billion provided by the 
Recovery Act divided among the AHRQ ($300 million), the National Institutes of 
Health ($400 million), and the Office of the HHS Secretary ($400 million). Agency for 
Healthcare Research & Quality, Overview of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, http://www.ahrq.gov/legacy/fund/cefarraover.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
 97 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) § 10303(a), amending 
§ 931(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-31(f) (2010) (giving the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services two years to develop at least ten outcome measurements for acute and chronic 
diseases, including the five most prevalent and resource-intensive conditions and three 
years to develop ten primary and preventative care measurements for distinct populations). 
 98 Once the research is completed, Section 6301 creates a system for 
distributing and posting in a database the results of this research through AHRQs Office 
of Communication and Knowledge Transfer. ACA § 6301(b), amending § 937(a)(1). 
 99 The PCOR Institute is not a government agency; instead, it is a non-profit 
institute. ACA § 6301(a), § 1181(b)(1). The PCOR website describes its goals as follows:  
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research (PCOR) helps people . . . make informed 
health care decisions, allowing their voices to be heard in assessing the value of 
health care options. This research answers patient-centered questions such as: 1. 
“Given my personal characteristics, conditions and preferences, what should I 
expect will happen to me?” 2. “What are my options and what are the benefits 
and harms of those options?” 3. “What can I do to improve the outcomes that 
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decision-making tools for both healthcare providers and 
consumers in light of the multiple medications and treatments 
that are marketed to deal with the same health condition.100  
Adding another layer to this push for the nationwide 
adoption of evidence-based medical practice is the ACA’s 
creation of the Center for Quality Improvement and Patient 
Safety (CQIPS).101 This center will develop tools to facilitate the 
adoption of best practices by healthcare providers.102 CQIPS will 
award grants and provide technical assistance in order to help 
providers adopt best practices.103 With the addition of this center, 
the ACA now has a system for the development of best practices 
(AHRQ104), a system for publicizing these best practices (PCOR), 
and a system for integrating these best practices (CQIPS) into 
the everyday practices of hospitals and physicians.  
Central to the ACA are the Health Benefit Exchanges. 
In keeping with the ACA’s theme of improving quality and cost 
of care, these exchanges also work instrumentally to move the 
ball forward in these areas.105 In order to qualify to sell 
  
are most important to me?” 4. “How can [the health care system] help me make 
the best decisions about my health and healthcare?” 
PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INST., PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES 
RESEARCH DEFINITION REVISION: RESPONSE TO PUBLIC INPUT (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.pcori.org/assets/PCOR-Definition-Revised-Draft-and-Responses-to-Input.pdf.  
To answer these questions, PCOR . . . [a] Assesses the benefits and harms of 
preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, . . . or health delivery system interventions to 
inform decision making, highlighting comparisons and outcomes that matter to 
people; [b] Is inclusive of an individual’s preferences, autonomy and needs, focusing 
on outcomes that people notice and care about such as survival, function, symptoms, 
and health-related quality of life; [c] Incorporates a wide variety of settings and 
diversity of participants to address individual differences and barriers to 
implementation and dissemination; and [d] Investigates (or may investigate) 
optimizing outcomes while addressing burden to individuals, resource availability, 
and other stakeholder perspectives. 
Id.  
 100 Priorities in research will be set according to gaps in the evidence over 
clinical outcomes, areas of variation in medical practice, and areas of practice where 
there are pressing quality concerns. These priorities will be delineated as part of the 
national strategy for quality care. Recovery Act § 1181(d)(1)(A). The institute must also 
release its research findings to clinicians, patients, and the public within ninety days of 
receiving them. Id. § 1181(d)(8)(A). These findings will be made available on the 
Institute’s website. Id. § 1181(h)(3). 
 101 ACA § 3501, § 933(a). 
 102 Recovery Act § 933(b)(2)-(5). 
 103 Id. § 934(a)(1). 
 104 See supra note 93.  
 105 Part II, Subtitle D of ACA, “Consumer Choices and Insurance Competition 
Through Health Benefit Exchanges” contains important quality components. ACA 
§ 1311 (spelling out the form of the American Health Benefit Exchanges). 
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insurance to consumers through these exchanges,106 insurers 
must evaluate providers by the same quality benchmarks that 
CMS uses to rate providers,107 as described above.108 As with the 
CMS reimbursements under Medicare, the higher the rating, 
the greater the private insurance reimbursement will be for 
healthcare services.109 Continuing the parallel, just like 
Medicare, the insurance companies must also publish the 
quality of care and patient satisfaction data that they gather.110 
In a major change to private insurance practices, the ACA111 
turns private insurers into mini regulatory agencies by 
requiring private insurers to:  
(A) improve health outcomes through the implementation of 
activities such as quality reporting, effective case management, care 
coordination, chronic disease management, and medication and care 
compliance initiatives, . . . for treatment or services under the plan 
or coverage; 
(B) implement activities to prevent hospital readmissions through a 
comprehensive program for hospital discharge that includes patient-
centered education and counseling, comprehensive discharge 
planning, and post discharge reinforcement by an appropriate health 
care professional;  
(C) implement activities to improve patient safety and reduce 
medical errors through the appropriate use of best clinical practices, 
evidence based medicine, and health information technology under 
the plan or coverage; and 
(D) implement wellness and health promotion activities.112 
  
 106 Subsection (c) details the criteria that health plans must meet to be 
“qualified” to be sold on the exchanges. Id. § 1311(c). 
 107 These bench marks are similar to the ones used by CMS including patient 
experience ratings, clinical quality measures, quality assurance, utilization 
management, provider credentialing, complaints and appeals, patient information 
programs and network adequacy and access. Id. § 1311(c)(1)(D). 
 108 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
 109 In the “Rewarding Quality Through Market-Based Incentives” sections of 
ACA, reimbursement is required to be based upon quality and health outcome scores. ACA 
§ 1311(g); id. § 1311(g)(1)(C) (payments must include incentives for “the implementation of 
activities to improve patient safety and reduce medical errors through the appropriate 
use of best clinical practices, evidence based medicine, and health information 
technology under the plan or coverage.”).  
 110 Subsection (c)(1)(E) requires the plans to “implement a quality 
improvement strategy,” id. § 1311(c)(1)(E), and subsection (c)(1)(H) requires disclosure 
of quality measures to enrollees and prospective enrollees. Id. § 1311(c)(1)(H). 
 111 Id. § 1001, § 2717(a)(1). 
 112 Id. § 1001, § 2717(a)(1)(A)-(D). With regard to hospitals specifically, for 
plans to be “qualified” to be sold on the health exchanges, § 1311(h), “Quality 
Improvement,” specifies that the plan may contract with a hospital with more than 
fifty beds only if the hospital “utilizes a patient safety evaluation system” and has a 
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Together, the quality improvement provisions under the 
ACA and CMS create a powerful regulatory engine that will 
work to move the United States from a system that follows the 
customary care model of medical care toward a modern, 
evidence-based system of medical care.  
III. THE GROWING NUMBER OF STATE TORT SYSTEMS 
ADOPTING EVIDENCE-BASED CARE AS THE STANDARD OF 
CARE  
State tort systems are slowly moving away from the 
current majority rule, which uses customary practice as 
conclusive evidence of the standard of care,113 as judges and 
lawyers begin to recognize the problems with using custom (as 
discussed above) as the exclusive proxy for quality.114 For 
example, in order to meet the standard of care in a medical 
malpractice case, a physician must “possess and use the care, 
skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed and used under like 
circumstances . . . .”115 Instead of limiting the scope of 
admissible evidence in defining reasonable care to what is 
customarily done under the circumstances, some state tort 
systems are also allowing the introduction of risk-benefit 
analysis grounded in empirical science as evidence of what is 
reasonable quality care under the circumstances. This 
transition away from the tort system’s use of custom as the 
exclusive proxy for quality appears to benefit both the quality 
and cost of healthcare. Thus, the tort systems of some states 
are operating instrumentally to encourage the transition away 
from custom-based medical practice to evidence-based medical 
practice. Unfortunately, as discussed below, the majority of 
state tort systems are acting to thwart that transition.  
  
mechanism in place “to ensure that each patient receives a comprehensive program for 
hospital discharge that includes patient-centered education and counseling, 
comprehensive discharge planning, and post discharge reinforcement by an 
appropriate health care professional.” Id. § 1311(h)(1)(A). 
 113 See generally Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern 
Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909 (2002) (discussing the merits of the role of 
custom as conclusive evidence of the standard of care in malpractice litigation and the 
movement by many states to use custom as only some evidence of the standard of care).  
 114 Id. at 909.  
 115 Burns v. Metz, 513 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Neb. 1994); Vergara v. Doan, 593 
N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ind. 1992) (judging the physician’s conduct by a “minimum standard 
of care for the particular practice”). For an excellent overview of medical malpractice 
law, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 242, 631-34 (2000). 
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A. Empirical Evidence of the Positive Impact on Quality of 
Healthcare of Rejecting Customary Care as the Exclusive 
Proxy for Quality 
The positive impact that an evidence-based standard of 
care in medical malpractice cases can have on quality and cost 
of care is borne out by a recent empirical study that used data 
on treatment utilization rates from 1977 to 2005 compiled by 
the National Hospital Discharge Surveys. This study estimated 
that there was “a 30 – 50% reduction in the gap between the 
state and national utilization rates of various obstetric, cardiac 
and diagnostic procedures following the abandonment of a rule 
requiring physicians to meet the standards set by local 
physicians and the contemporaneous adoption of a national-
standard rule.”116 The author of the study, Professor Michael 
Frakes of Cornell Law School, finds that in the context of 
medical malpractice, “custom-based liability standards may 
indeed encourage the perpetuation of customary practices and 
likewise discourage deviations from custom . . . .”117 Professor 
Frakes concludes that 
the results of this study more generally suggest that a malpractice 
rule that bases standards of care on customary physician practices 
may indeed incentivize the perpetuation of those customary 
practices and, at the same time, discourage deviations from 
custom. . . . 
 The employment of custom-based standards, moreover, carries a 
number of important policy implications, particularly with respect to 
the possible role that they may play in discouraging cost-reducing 
innovations in delivery practices. Legal scholars have long 
recognized that the effectiveness of managed care and related 
strategies may be blunted by a medical liability system that holds 
physicians to a standard of care determined according to customary 
physician practices, where those practices were developed in a 
predominantly fee-for-service environment that may have 
encouraged excessive practice styles.118 
Professor Frakes goes on to state that,  
[b]y arguably establishing the empirical relevancy of the customary 
component to malpractice standards, this study validates these 
concerns and thereby lends support to proposals that call for a 
  
 116 Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional 
Variations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard 
Rules 1 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 37-38. 
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relaxation of customary-standard requirements, including those that 
argue for a stronger role for “reasonableness” in malpractice-
standard determinations or, as above, a more definitive role for 
clinical practice guidelines in malpractice proceedings.119 
As is the case with the use of customary care standards 
in medical malpractice litigation, the reliance on the customary 
care proxy for quality in licensure proceedings and hospital 
peer review is also likely to entrench custom-based decision 
making at the cost of quality of care. This conclusion finds 
support in several studies. First, a study was released in 2005 
that demonstrated that physicians fail to provide simple, yet 
essential, healthcare for common, serious conditions.120 Another 
study, released in December of 2012, revealed that the 
intervening seven years since the 2005 study have brought 
little change in these failures, demonstrating that physicians 
are surprisingly slow to adopt evidence-based care.121 In a 
recent New Yorker article, quality-of-care expert and Harvard 
Professor Atul Gawande noted that there is a disconcerting 
fifteen-year average lag time in the adoption by physicians of 
evidence-based practice choices.122 Another study released in 
2010 demonstrated that the rate of injuries in hospitals from 
physician errors remained unchanged in the ten years since the 
IOM Report. This status quo exists in spite of multiple 
initiatives to improve quality.123 Importantly, the study found 
that “the penetration of evidence-based safety practices has been 
quite modest. For example, . . . [c]ompliance with even simple 
interventions such as hand washing is poor in many centers.”124  
This article suggests that one reason for the failure of 
evidence-based practices to penetrate into daily medical 
practice may be the continued use of customary care as the 
  
 119 Id. at 38 (footnote omitted). The study done by Professor Frakes lends 
empirical support for my arguments for a greater role for evidence based medicine, in 
the form of Clinical Practice Guidelines, in the hospital peer review process made in 
my 2006 article. See Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1241-55. 
 120 Jha, supra note 22; see also supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.  
 121 Kale et al., supra note 12.  
 122 Atul Gawande, Big Med, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/08/13/120813fa_fact_gawande; see also infra 
note 162.  
 123 Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm 
Resulting from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 2130 (2010) (“In a statewide 
study of 10 North Carolina hospitals, we found that harm resulting from medical care 
was common, with little evidence that rate of harm had decreased substantially over a 6-
year period ending in December 2007.”).  
 124 Id. at 2125.  
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exclusive proxy for quality of care by the tort, licensure, and 
hospital peer review systems.  
B. How Does the Conflict Between Evidence-Based 
Medicine and Custom-Based Medicine Play Out in a 
Malpractice Action?  
An example of how the conflict between custom-based 
and evidence-based medicine manifests itself in a medical 
malpractice action occurs when a physician chooses whether to 
use a stent to treat a patient who has blocked coronary arteries 
and stable coronary heart disease.  
It is part of customary practice to prop open blocked 
arteries with a stent, a practice called percutaneous coronary 
intervention or “PCI.”125 With PCI, a physician implants a mesh 
tube into an artery to hold it open when it is narrowed by 
accumulated plaque. This tube allows blood to flow more 
freely.126 The total cost for the placement of a stent is between 
30 and 50 thousand dollars and more than one million of these 
procedures are performed every year.127 This means a total cost 
to the healthcare system of between 30 to 50 billion dollars.128 
In addition, there are risks associated with this procedure 
which include the possibility of a heart attack, stroke, serious 
allergic reactions, bleeding, and kidney damage.129 When these 
risks are manifested, the cost to the system of this treatment 
expands exponentially.  
A recent meta-study of randomized trials published in 
early 2012 (the 2012 Stent Study) demonstrates that an 
inexpensive treatment with a handful of prescription drugs—a 
mix of ACE inhibitors, statins, beta-blockers, and daily 
aspirin—provides the same treatment benefits as stents for the 
  
 125 This is a procedure called percutaneous coronary intervention (or “PCI”) in which 
a surgeon inserts a mesh tube made of metal into an artery that has become 
narrowed by accumulated plaque. The [mesh] tube [is] threaded through an artery 
in the leg or arm[.] [Then it] expands to hold the artery open at the point where 
blood flow is restricted [by accumulated plaque]. 
Nicholas Bakalar, No Extra Benefits Are Seen in Stents for Coronary Artery Disease, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012, at D7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/ 
health/stents-show-no-extra-benefits-for-coronary-artery-disease.html.  
 126 Id.  
 127 Id.  
 128 Id. 
 129 Id.  
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prevention of chest pain, heart attacks, and death.130 The 
authors of the study conclude that, “In the context of 
controlling rising health care costs in the United States, this 
study suggests that up to 76% of patients with stable CAD 
[coronary artery disease] can avoid PCI [percutaneous coronary 
intervention (such as stenting)] altogether if treated with 
optimal medical therapy . . . .”131 Evidence-based medicine 
would involve incorporating this meta-study into daily practice 
choices and trying drug therapy before resorting to 
implantation of a stent.  
One of the authors of the study, Dr. David Brown of the 
Stony Brook University Medical Center in New York, doubts 
that this study will change the behavior of many physicians.132 
He explains that,  
In many hospitals, the cardiac service line generates 40 percent of 
the total hospital revenue, so there’s incredible pressure to do more 
procedures. . . . When you put in a stent, everyone is happy—the 
hospital is making more money, the doctor is making more money—
everybody is happier except the health care system as a whole, 
which is paying more money for no better results.133  
The 2012 Stent Study provides an opportunity to 
explain how the conflict between a custom-based medicine 
treatment choice and an evidence-based treatment choice 
might play out in a medical malpractice action. If a patient 
with stable coronary heart disease dies as the result of the 
insertion of a stent (for example, the surgery causes a heart 
attack) and that patient was treated in one of the majority of 
states where customary care is conclusive evidence of the 
quality of care,134 that patient’s estate would be unlikely to 
persuade a malpractice attorney to take the case in the first 
instance. The duty of care is fairly consistent in most states, 
  
 130 Kathleen Stergiopoulus & David L. Brown, Less Is More: Initial Coronary 
Stent Implantation with Medical Therapy vs Medical Therapy Alone for Stable 
Coronary Artery Disease: Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 172 ARCH. 
INTERN. MED. 312, 312-18 (2012) (analysis included results on more than 7200 patients 
enrolled in eight studies between 1997 and 2005 comparing stents with medical 
therapy in stable heart patients with narrowed sections in their heart arteries). Over 
half of those with stable coronary artery disease were implanted with stents before 
they tried drug treatment. Julie Steenhuysen, Pills as Good as Stents for Some 
Patients: Study, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
02/28/us-pills-stents-idUSTRE81R24520120228. 
 131 Stergiopoulus & Brown, supra note 130, at 318.  
 132 Steenhuysen, supra note 130. 
 133 Bakalar, supra note 125.  
 134 See DOBBS, supra note 115, § 243, at 634-35. 
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which is to provide the kind of care used by a reasonable 
physician, who has like education, training, and expertise, 
under the circumstances.135 Here, the issue is the kind of 
treatment that a reasonable cardiologist would provide for a 
person with stable coronary artery disease and a blocked 
coronary artery.136 In a customary care state, the only relevant 
evidence on this issue is evidence of what the customary 
treatment by a cardiologist would be for a patient with this 
condition.137 The evidence will show that the custom is to implant 
a stent. The physician complied with the custom and, therefore, 
did not breach the standard of care, even though the patient died. 
Based on these facts, this case has little chance of success.  
The 2012 Stent Study, described above, would not be 
relevant and therefore would be inadmissible. The study could 
not be admitted to show that the risks of stent implantation far 
outweighed the benefits and that, therefore, it was 
unreasonable to implant the stent. This study is not relevant 
evidence in a customary care state because it does not help 
answer the question of what constitutes customary care for 
patients with stable coronary artery disease and blocked 
coronary arteries. For this reason, the physician is rewarded by 
the tort system for following the custom, even though evidence-
based medical practice suggests a different treatment choice.  
The situation changes dramatically if the cardiologist 
did not place a stent and, instead, prescribed the far less 
expensive, less risky, and equally effective treatment—using 
medications to treat the patient—and the patient died of a 
heart attack from a blocked artery. This physician, although 
making the choice encouraged by evidence-based medical 
practice, would not be able to use the 2012 Stent Study to 
protect herself or himself from liability by showing that the 
decision not to place the stent was reasonable. The study, once 
again, would be inadmissible. Unlike the first scenario, where 
it is unlikely that a plaintiff’s lawyer would even take the case 
in the first place, a plaintiff’s lawyer would be likely to take 
this case because the custom is to implant a stent and the 
cardiologist did not do so. The plaintiff’s lawyer could easily 
find an expert to testify that the custom is to implant a stent 
and that, if the stent would have been implanted, the blockage 
would have been bypassed and the patient would have been 
  
 135 Id.  
 136 Assuming there were no other confounding conditions.  
 137 See DOBBS, supra note 115, § 243, at 634-35. 
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unlikely to have had a heart attack and died. While the 
defendant physician will likely have an expert to testify that an 
equally acceptable custom is to treat with medications,138 this 
  
 138 A brief note on the two schools of thought defense just to be sure that it is 
clear that this affirmative defense does not ameliorate this conflict: One of the oft-cited 
cases that describes the two schools of thought defense is the Pennsylvania case of 
Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992). As the court in Jones explains, under this 
defense, if there are two approaches to treating a particular condition, one is chosen by 
a majority of physicians and one that is followed by a “considerable number of 
recognized and respected individuals,” the defendant physician will not be held liable 
for adopting the treatment choice of this considerable minority. Id. at 969. There are 
multiple reasons why this defense does not alter the conflict described by the stenting 
hypothetical. First, there is a question regarding whether a particular state has 
adopted this defense. Second, the relevance of the defense will depend on whether the 
state has adopted the locality rule, the same or similar locality rule, or the national 
rule. The defense will not be viable if the evidence-based treatment choice has not 
garnered enough support to reflect the practice choice of a considerable minority in 
either the same locality, the same community or a similar locality, or on a national 
basis under the national rule, depending on which rule the state has adopted. Many 
evidence-based treatment choices will initially be adopted only in large cities where 
there are teaching hospitals. Thus, it will not be a practice choice of very many 
physicians in the vast majority of communities that exist outside the large cities for a 
considerable number of years, if at all. And, under the national rule, it will take a great 
deal of time before the number of physicians who have adopted the evidence-based 
treatment choice reaches a “considerable number” of physicians, especially if the state 
adopts a proportionality test. In a recent New Yorker article, quality of care expert 
Harvard Professor Atul Gawande noted that there is a disconcerting fifteen year average 
lag time in the adoption by physicians of evidence-based practice choices. Gawande, supra 
note 122; see also infra note 162. 
  Over and above this problem of relevance, it is important to note that this 
is an affirmative defense as well as a question of fact. The physician will have to go to 
trial as the applicability of this defense is a question of fact for the jury to decide. As 
the physician is faced with going through the emotional turmoil and cost of an entire 
trial, once again, the physician will be significantly deterred from adopting the 
evidence-based practice choice. “[P]hysicians consistently report that they often engage 
in defensive practices and that they feel intense pressure to do so out of fear of 
becoming the subject of a malpractice suit.” Emily R. Carrier et al., Physicians’ Fear of 
Malpractice Lawsuits Are Not Assuaged by Tort Reforms, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1585, 
1585 (2010) (citing David Studdert et al, Defensive Medicine and Tort Reform: A Wide 
View, 25 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 380, 380 (2010), and David Studdert et al., Defensive 
Medicine Among High Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice 
Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005)). “[I]ndividual physicians’ concerns about 
their own malpractice risk are pervasive, vary across specialties in ways that are likely 
to reflect underlying malpractice risk, and reflect objective measures of risk across 
states to a limited degree.” Id. What stands out is that “the level of liability concern 
reported by physicians is arguably out of step with the actual risk of experiencing a 
malpractice claim.” Id. at 1591. One explanation is the common tendency for most to 
over-estimate what are called “dread-risks,” which are rare but have devastating 
outcomes. This tendency  
relates to the well-documented human tendencies to overestimate the risk of rare 
events and to be particularly fearful of risks that are unfamiliar, potentially 
catastrophic, or difficult to control. Lawsuits are rare events in a physician’s career, 
but physicians tend to overestimate the likelihood of experiencing them. . . . Severe, 
unpredictable, uncontrollable events are associated with a feeling of dread that 
triggers a statistically irrational level of risk aversion. . . . Physicians may be subject 
to this phenomenon when it comes to malpractice suits. Because of the rarity of the 
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“battle of the experts” is likely to create a reasonable question 
of fact, and the case will be likely to survive a motion for 
summary judgment and go to a jury. Thus, the physician will not 
avoid litigation and will be “punished” for adopting evidence-
based practice and failing to follow the custom in this case.  
As the Frakes Study suggests, physicians are very 
motivated to avoid litigation. Consequently, until the majority 
of the states adopt the minority rule and allow the introduction 
of risk-benefit analysis grounded in empirical science as 
evidence of what is reasonable care under the circumstances, 
the customary care rule will be a road block in the federal 
government’s quest to transition away from custom-based 
medical practice to evidence-based medical practice.  
IV. HOSPITAL PEER REVIEW 
Private peer review is a self-policing system conducted 
in hospitals where physicians informally evaluate each other 
and report on those physicians who are allegedly failing to 
provide quality patient care to hospital administration.139 If, 
after an investigation and hearing conducted by the hospital,140 
a physician is found to have provided poor quality of care, that 
physician may be penalized in a variety of ways, including the 
termination of the physician’s hospital staff privileges.141  
  
suits, most physicians have little familiarity with them. The consequences of being 
sued are perceived as potentially disastrous to one’s medical reputation, 
psychological well-being, and financial stability. Finally, physicians tend to view 
lawsuits as random events, unpredictable and uncontrollable, because they are not 
viewed as related to the quality of care provided. These factors may lead to a fear of 
suits that seems out of proportion to the actual risk of being sued. 
Id.; see also David Studdert et al, Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283 
(2004); A.G. Lawthers, Physicians Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued, 17 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y L. 463 (1992). Finally, the two schools of thought rule was developed to deal 
with two different customs of care that existed in light of scientific uncertainty over 
which choice was the most effective with the least associated risk. It should not be 
relevant, as a public health matter, when there is a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty over treatment choice, especially if one treatment choice is especially risky or 
just plain ineffective. 
 139 VIRGIL SLEE ET AL., SLEE’S HEALTHCARE TERMS 439 (5th ed. 2008). For a 
detailed explanation of this process, see Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1194-97. 
 140 Hospital peer review is conducted pursuant to the obligations of the 
hospital medical staff to ensure “the quality of the professional services provided by 
individuals with clinical privileges . . . .” JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF 
HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE 
OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, MS.1, at MS-2 (1999) [hereinafter CAMH].  
 141 CREDENTIALING AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICE GROUP OF THE AM. HEALTH 
LAWYER’S ASS’N, PEER REVIEW GUIDEBOOK 60, MS-7 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter PEER 
REVIEW GUIDEBOOK]; CAMH, supra note 140, at MS-7.  
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In 1986, Congress passed the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act (HCQIA) in response to a perceived crisis 
over the costs for insurance coverage for medical malpractice.142 
HCQIA gave a Congressional stamp of approval to the hospital 
peer review process by providing conditional immunity from 
suit to those who participated in the process.143 After the 
passage of HCQIA, the rate of hospital adoption of peer review 
processes increased dramatically until today all of the nation’s 
hospitals have adopted some form of peer review.  
HCQIA also set up the National Practitioner Data Bank 
(NPDB).144 Under the Act and its regulations, multiple different 
organizations are required to report information involving 
physicians that allegedly reflects the provision of poor quality 
patient care. For example, insurance companies must report 
malpractice payments and settlements on behalf of physicians 
to the NPDB,145 state licensing boards must report disciplinary 
actions to the NPDB,146 and healthcare providers147 must report 
  
 142 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2006). For a complete history of HCQIA, see 
Katharine Van Tassel, Using Clinical Practice Guidelines and Knowledge Translation 
Theory to Cure the Negative Impact of the Hospital Peer Review Hearing System on 
Healthcare Quality, Cost and Access?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 911 (2013).  
 143 Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1194-97; see MICHAEL A. CASSIDY, IMMUNITY 
FOR CREDENTIALING DECISIONS UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 38 (2003).  
 144 42 U.S.C. § 11101. The Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA) has “federal oversight responsibility for [the] NPDB.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO-01-130, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS 
ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE DATA BANK’S RELIABILITY 7 (2000) [hereinafter MAJOR 
IMPROVEMENTS], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01130.pdf. HRSA 
completed the regulations that established the operation of the NPDB in October of 
1989. Id. While HRSA is responsible for ensuring compliance with these regulations, 
the actual day-to-day operation of the NPDB is performed by a private operator. Id. In 
2010, the list of healthcare professionals that the NPDB reports on was expanded from 
just physicians and dentists to all healthcare practitioners by the passage of new 
regulations. In addition, the list of entities that can query the NPDB has expanded to 
include “private sector hospitals, nursing homes, and other organizations so that they 
may be used when making employment, affiliation, certification, or licensure 
decisions.” Legislation and Regulations: Why Is Section 1921 Important?, DATA BANK, 
http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/section1921.jsp (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). 
Thus,  
[h]ospitals and their human resource departments and nurse recruitment offices 
now have access to licensure actions on all types of health care professionals. They 
may query the Data Bank on all types of health care professionals including nurses, 
nurse aides, and other allied health care professionals when making their hiring 
decisions. The ability to perform pre-employment screenings of potential health care 
employees is an invaluable resource that can enhance the hiring process and 
increase an organization’s efforts towards patient safety.  
Id. 
 145 42 U.S.C. § 11101. 
 146 Id. 
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peer review actions to the NPDB that restrict a physician’s 
clinical privileges for more than thirty days.148  
Hospitals must also check the NPDB for negative 
reports on each physician applying for staff privileges and must 
check the NPDB for negative reports every two years for every 
physician who already has staff privileges.149  
A. Hospital Peer Review Relies Upon Customary Care 
Standards 
Unfortunately, one of the main standards150 that hospital 
peer review relies upon to measure physician competence 
  
 147 For example, hospitals and health plans. These new regulations bring the 
states into the picture by requiring hospitals to send reports of all actions “that 
adversely affect[] the clinical privileges of a physician or dentist for a period of longer 
than 30 days,” 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (2000), to the state licensure board. The state licensure 
boards are then required to report this information to the NPDB. National Practitioner 
Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners: 
Reporting on Adverse and Negative Actions, 75 Fed. Reg. 4677, § 60.5(d) (Jan. 28, 2010). 
 148 MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 144, at 7. Even private professional 
societies such as the American Dental Association and the American Medical 
Association must report sanctions that impact membership. Id. Some federal agencies, 
such as the VA, must report to the NPDB any negative actions that involve physicians 
whom they insure, employ, or regulate. Id. at 7-8. Practitioners who are excluded from 
participating in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs must also be reported if they either 
default on federal loan agreements or engage in fraud or abuse. Id. at 8-9. 
 149 Id. at 9. There are also organizations which are allowed to query the 
NPDB, such as professional societies and state licensure boards, but they are not 
required to do so. Id. Individual physicians may only query for information about 
themselves. Id. 
 150 The other major category of standards commonly used in hospital peer 
review is one that expressly vests complete and unfettered discretion in decision 
makers is one which gives a hospital’s governing body “the right to remove any member 
of the medical staff or to deprive any physician or surgeon of the privileges of the 
hospital whenever in their sole judgment the good of the hospital or the patients 
therein may demand it.” N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1962); 
see also Tasher v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., No. 87-1139, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1018, at *5 (E.D. La. 1988) (The executive committee had complete discretion to 
summarily suspend privileges “whenever action must be taken immediately in the best 
interest of patient care in the hospital”; this same broad standard was applied at the 
post-deprivation hearing.). Also included in this category are those by-laws that are 
less blatant but, in application, still call for a purely subjective determination. These 
standards define the required level of competence as that which the decision makers 
determine is the “best possible care,” Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 345 P.2d 93, 
95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (only physicians and surgeons who, in the judgment of the 
board, would provide the “best possible care and professional skill” were granted staff 
privileges); see also Duby v. Jordan Hosp., 341 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Mass. 1976) (hospital, 
“in judging the [physician’s] professional competence[,] required that he give his 
patients the ‘best possible care’”); Huffaker v. Bailey, 540 P.2d 1398, 1399 (Or. 1975) 
(physician must provide to patients “a high quality of medical care”), or “adequate 
medical care,” Koelling v. Bd. of Trs. of Mary Francis Skiff Mem’l Hosp., 146 N.W.2d 
284, 296-97 (Iowa 1966) (failure to provide “adequate” medical care); see also Bock v. 
John C. Lincoln Hosp., 702 P.2d 253, 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (physician’s staff 
privileges were terminated because Executive Committee determined that the 
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consists of the same customary care standards that many state 
tort systems are starting to eschew based on concerns about 
their impact on quality of care.151 As is the case with the use of 
customary care standards in medical malpractice litigation, the 
reliance on customary care in peer review acts to entrench 
custom-based decision making at the cost of quality of care. 
However, the hospital peer review system provides an even 
stronger disincentive to the adoption of evidence-based 
medicine than the other quality systems. As discussed more 
fully in the next section, according to physicians, the 
termination of staff privileges triggered by a negative peer 
review report that is also filed with the NPDB can be a “career 
ender” because it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, to obtain 
staff privileges in another hospital or a new position that does 
not require staff privileges thereafter.152  
  
physician “failed to demonstrate to the Medical Committee that [he was] qualified to 
practice as an Internal Medicine specialist.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), or 
“high quality medical care,” Gaenslen v. Bd. of Dir. of St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
232 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242 (Ct. App. 1985) (standard that excluded physicians from staff 
privileges who did not provide “high quality” care); Huffaker, 540 P.2d at 1399-401 
(requirement that physicians provide a “high quality of medical care”). For a complete 
explanation of why these standards supply few limitations on the discretion of the 
decision makers which lead to a high risk of arbitrary and capricious decision making, 
see Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1197-1241.  
 151 Examples of the standards that fall into this category of customary care 
include those which hold physicians to a standard of care as measured by the 
“[hospital’s] standard of competence,” Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 544 
N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ill. 1989) (physician’s treatment of patients failed to conform to “the 
Center’s standard of competence”), or the “standard of the hospital or the medical 
staff,” Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 252 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 1977) (corrective 
action appropriate when “professional conduct of any member of the staff shall be 
considered to be lower than the standard of the hospital or the medical staff”); see also 
Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974); DOBBS, supra note 115, § 242, at 633; 
Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 246, 248-49 (Ct. App. 1988) (Newly 
minted surgeon who had excellent credentials and training evaluations during his 
residency ran afoul of a group of surgeons in the hospital where he started his practice. 
Members of this group of physicians both served on the peer review panels charged 
with judging whether the new surgeon met this in-house standard and testified that 
the new surgeon “did not ‘meet the general standards of the surgical community at El 
Camino Hospital . . . .’”). 
 152 See infra notes 153-63 and accompanying text; see also Sheree Lynn 
McCall, A Hospital’s Liability for Denying, Suspending and Granting Staff Privileges, 
32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 175 (1980) (“A physician’s livelihood is dependent on acquiring 
and maintaining hospital staff privileges. The access to hospital facilities is necessary 
for most physicians to adequately treat and care for patients, to maintain their medical 
practice, and to pursue their medical career.”). 
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B. Peer Review Sanctions Can Be a “Career Ender,” 
Chilling the Adoption of Evidence-Based Medicine 
The loss of hospital staff privileges in one hospital as 
the result of a negative peer review report can mean the end of 
a physician’s career.153 A good example is that of a surgeon. For 
a surgeon, lack of access to hospital facilities to perform 
surgeries, in effect, ends that physician’s career.154 The most 
obvious situation where this will occur is when there is only 
one hospital facility in the community.155 Loss of clinical 
privileges at that sole hospital is likely to mean being barred 
from the practice of medicine in that community.156  
  
 153 For a detailed discussion of the myriad problems with hospital peer review, 
including its questionable constitutionality, see generally Katharine Van Tassel, 
Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal System for Publishing Reports of 
“BAD” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2031 
(2012); McCall, supra note 152, at 175; Note, The Physician’s Right to Hospital Staff 
Membership: The Public-Private Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 510-11 
(concluding a successful doctor must have access to hospitals).  
 154 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: HORNBOOK SERIES § 7-1, 374 
(2000) (explaining that precondition to the practice of medicine is access to hospitals). 
 155 Kiracofe v. Reid Mem’l Hosp., 461 N.E.2d 1134, 1142 (Ind. 1984) (noting 
that when a hospital is the only one in a community, “its economic impact is great, and 
the denial of hospital privileges, in many cases, is tantamount to denying a physician 
the opportunity to practice his or her chosen profession”). In Greisman v. Newcomb 
Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 824 (N.J. 1963), the court described the situation as follows:  
The Newcomb Hospital is the only hospital in the Vineland metropolitan area and it 
is publicly dedicated, primarily to the care of the sick and injured of Vineland and its 
vicinity . . . . Doctors need hospital facilities and a physician practicing in the 
metropolitan Vineland area will understandably seek them at the Newcomb 
Hospital. Furthermore, every patient of his will want the Newcomb Hospital 
facilities to be readily available. It hardly suffices to say that the patient could enter 
the hospital under the care of a member of the existing staff, for his personal 
physician would have no opportunity of participating in his treatment; nor does it 
suffice to say that there are other hospitals outside the metropolitan Vineland area, 
for they may be too distant or unsuitable to his needs and desires. All this indicates 
very pointedly that, while the managing officials may have discretionary powers in 
the selection of the medical staff, those powers are deeply imbedded in public 
aspects, and are rightly viewed, for policy reasons . . . as fiduciary powers to be 
exercised reasonably and for the public good. 
Id. 
 156 Kiracofe, 461 N.E.2d at 1142; Greisman, 192 A.2d at 824. What many seem 
to lose sight of is that a physician’s inability to practice has a ripple effect—when a 
physician can no longer practice medicine, all of that physician’s patients lose access to 
healthcare. This situation could impact hundreds of people. The loss of their physician 
is especially hard on those who are dependent on Medicaid and Medicare; it could be 
years before they are able to find a new physician willing to take on new Medicaid or 
Medicare patients. One in three physicians are currently turning away new Medicaid 
patients. Robert Lowes, Almost 1 in 3 Physicians Turn Away New Medicaid Patients, 
MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/768763. 
This situation will grow exponentially worse as the physician shortage grows and 
millions of new ACA patients and aging baby boomers flood the system. 
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While taking a bit more time to occur, an adverse peer 
review finding will ultimately impact the physician who 
practices in a very large community with multiple hospitals in 
the same disastrous way. When the hospitals perform their 
mandatory check of the NPDB for physicians applying for staff 
privileges for the first time, or their biennial check for 
physicians already on staff, the negative report will become 
known.157 A termination or limitation of staff privileges at one 
hospital is likely to trigger a second hospital to follow suit to 
avoid placing itself at risk of being sued for negligent 
credentialing.158 A national survey revealed that in 2007 alone, 
48,075 licensure, credentialing, or membership decisions were 
impacted by NPDB reports.159 
Dr. Edward Dench, Jr., former President of the 
Pennsylvania Medical Society, opines that a data bank report 
  
 157 See supra note 149. 
 158 In a GAO Report on the problems with the accuracy of the data contained 
in the NPDB, the agency acknowledged that the information contained in the databank 
“can affect a practitioner’s reputation and livelihood.” MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS, supra 
note 144, at 3. A HRSA survey revealed that NPDB users, including credentialing 
committees, chiefs of the medical staff, department chairs and the chief executive 
officers, found the reports to be an important part of the credentialing process. Teresa 
Waters et al., The Role of the National Practitioner Data Bank in the Credentialing 
Process, AM. J. MED. QUALITY 34 (2006). 
 159 ALAN LEVINE & SIDNEY WOLFE, HOSPITALS DROP THE BALL ON PHYSICIAN 
OVERSIGHT 6 & n.7 (2009), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/18731.pdf. 
The Levine Report reached this conclusion using data from TERESA WATERS ET AL., 
NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK USER AND NON-USER SURVEY FINAL REPORT 169 
tbl.IV.C.94 (Apr. 2001). The authors of the Levine Report explained that they reached 
this conclusion based on Waters’s  
survey question which was “Would your decision regarding the practitioner have 
been different if you had not received the NPDB response.” 9.04 percent of the 
responses answered “yes.” Applying this percentage to the 531,802 matches for 2007 
results in an estimated 48,075 decisions that were affected by an NPDB report.  
LEVINE & WOLFE, supra, at 6 n.7.  
Adding to the cascade of negative effects a physician faces from a negative peer 
review report is the loss of both medical insurance and the termination of managed 
care contracts. In most states, a physician cannot practice without liability 
insurance. . . . And the loss of managed care contracts alone can destroy a 
physician’s practice, even without all of the other negative consequences of being 
blacklisted. The amazing growth of managed care compels the participation of 
almost all health care providers in managed care contracts. Physicians who are not 
part of a practice group with managed care contracts, or who are not preferred 
providers with multiple managed care organizations, have a difficult time 
maintaining a practice. In order to be considered for, or maintain, these contracts, 
health care providers must work to stay in good standing with these managed care 
organizations. Physicians who lose hospital staff privileges for quality of care 
reasons are highly likely to face the immediate termination of managed care 
contracts. 
Van Tassel, supra note 153, at 2061-62 (footnote omitted). 
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“can essentially make you unemployable, and it can be the 
difference between getting insurance and not getting 
insurance.”160 A far-reaching and comprehensive study 
commissioned by the State of California into the reasons for the 
low and declining level of reporting of negative peer review 
actions to the NPDB supports Dr. Dench’s claim, revealing that  
physicians who have been the subject of [a negative peer review 
action] state that it is difficult or impossible to find a new position, 
their professional lives are ruined, other entities will not grant 
privileges even if they have fulfilled the terms of the discipline, and 
they spend years and hundreds of thousands of dollars in court 
trying to clear their professional names and reputations.  
. . . . 
. . . Physicians who had experienced [having a negative peer review 
report state that it] . . . was a “career ender.”161 
Thus, like the tort and licensure systems, the threat of a 
hospital peer review action provides a powerful disincentive to 
switching from custom-based to evidence-based practice. 
Arguably, the hospital peer review system, with its career-
ending potential, is an even greater obstacle to this conversion.  
V. SOLUTIONS 
The solution to this disconnect between the ACA and 
the other three systems for improving healthcare quality, cost, 
and access involves both top-down and bottom-up strategies. In 
the context of the tort and licensure systems, the solution is a 
top-down one because it requires action on the part of state 
legislatures or court systems. It is up to legislators or judges to 
change the scope of the admissible evidence in medical 
malpractice and licensure cases, either by statute or case law, 
to allow risk–benefit analysis based on empirical evidence to 
become admissible on the issue of the standard of care.  
  
 160 Steve Twedt, A Negative Data Bank Listing Isn’t Easy to Erase, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 27, 2003), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/ 
03300/234532.stm. 
 161 LUMETRA, COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF PEER REVIEW IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL 
REPORT 65, 94 (2008) (citation omitted), available at http://www.mbc.ca.gov/ 
publications/peer_review.pdf (Physicians with negative peer review reports “described 
not being able to find any position or job after having [a negative] report filed and 
spending three to five years in [peer review] hearings and other procedures to fight for 
their reputations, even after the [licensure board] found no wrongdoing on their part. 
They reported spending thousands of dollars to fight the charges so they could again 
practice as physicians.”). 
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On the other hand, the solution is a bottom-up one when 
it comes to hospital peer review. Of course, because rational 
physicians are likely to balk at adopting evidence-based 
treatment choices if it will result in a lawsuit, the laws that 
make custom the exclusive proxy for quality must first be 
changed as explained above.  
Next, as described below, regulations under the ACA 
should be formulated to allow for the integration of evidence-
based medicine into hospital practice. To date, efforts to 
integrate evidence-based treatment choices into physician 
practice have met with little success. Scores of studies have 
revealed that physicians are being exposed to evidence-based 
medicine in the form of clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) on a 
regular basis—they go to seminars, listen, agree, then go back 
to practice and ignore the new information.162 The disconnect 
that these studies evince is a well-studied problem of 
translating knowledge into action.  
  
 162 See, e.g., Lee A. Green & Colleen M. Seifert, Translation of Research into 
Practice: Why We Can’t “Just Do It,” J. AM. BD. FAM. PRAC. 541, 541 (2004) (There is 
“widespread agreement that physicians and healthcare systems simply do not put new 
knowledge about how to improve our patients’ outcomes into practice nearly quickly 
enough. . . . For example, consider the guideline that ‘congestive heart failure patients 
should be evaluated for use of beta-blockers.’ An expert physician may be aware of this 
recommendation and may wholeheartedly accept it as good practice, but may still fail 
to adopt it when they happen to see an elderly patient in the clinic who could benefit 
from beta-blockade. Knowledge of evidence can remain separate from, and not 
integrated into, the physician’s extensive database of procedures that guides their 
decision and actions. This makes the likelihood of recognizing that the new knowledge 
is appropriate and incorporating it into these well-rehearsed procedures very 
uncertain.”); Illaria Baiardini et al., Why Do Doctors and Patients Not Follow 
Guidelines, 9 CURR. OPIN. ALLERGY CLIN. IMMUNOL. 228, 228 (2009) (“During the last 
few years, different studies and theories have tried to explain the reason why doctors 
and patients do not follow guidelines. . . . [A]lthough the effort made to develop and 
divulge evidenced-based guidelines, results of studies conducted in the United States 
and the Netherlands suggest that most of the time, guidelines are not applied[;] about 
30-40% of patients do not benefit from a cure programme based on scientific evidence, 
whereas 20-25% of therapeutic choices may be unnecessary and sometimes even 
harmful.”); Michael D. Cabana et al., Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice 
Guidelines?, 282 JAMA 1458, 1458 (1999) (“Despite wide promulgation, [clinical 
practice] guidelines have had limited effect on changing physician behavior.”); Justin 
W. Timbie et al., Five Reasons that Many Comparative Effectiveness Studies Fail to 
Change Patient Care and Clinical Practice, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2168, 2168 (2012) 
(“[D]ecades of experience suggest that translating evidence into changes in clinical 
practice is rarely rapid . . . .”); David A. Davis et al., Translating Guidelines Into 
Practice: A Systematic Review of Theoretic Concepts, Practical Experience and Research 
Evidence in the Adopting of Clinical Practice Guidelines, 15 CAN. MED. ASS’N 408, 408 
(1997) (“The evidence shows serious deficiencies in the adoption of CPGs in practice.”).  
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A. Translating Knowledge into Action  
Behavioral scientists have developed a large body of 
empirical research on how to effectively put knowledge into action, 
which has resulted in the creation of what many call “knowledge 
translation theory” or “research implementation theory.”163 
Knowledge translation theory teaches that there are seven action 
phases that are key to translating knowledge into action: 
[1] specific identification of the problem;  
[2] identifying, reviewing, and selecting the knowledge to implement;  
[3] adapting or customizing the knowledge to the local context;  
[4] assessing the determinants of knowledge use;  
[5] selecting, tailoring, implementing, and monitoring knowledge 
translation interventions and knowledge uptake;  
[6] evaluating outcomes or impact of using the knowledge; and 
[7] determining strategies for ensuring sustained knowledge use.164 
These seven action steps can occur in seriatim. In 
addition, it is important to note that these knowledge steps can 
change the action phases at any point in the sequence.165 “The 
action parts of the cycle are based on planned action theories that 
focus on deliberately engineering change in health care systems 
and groups.”166 An important part of the theory is to actively 
consider the particular circumstances of the physicians who are 
the end users of the knowledge that is being assimilated.167  
The solution that this article proposes is the use of 
knowledge translation theory to integrate knowledge about 
effective treatment choices that have been developed through 
empirical science into daily physician practice. The empirically 
based knowledge that this proposal focuses on is the use of best 
practices based upon evidence-based guidelines called clinical 
practice guidelines (CPGs) to guide treatment choices.168 CPGs 
  
 163 Sharon E. Straus et al., Knowledge Translation Is the Use of Knowledge in 
Health Care Decision Making, 64 J. CLIN. EPI. 6, 6-10 (Jan. 2011). 
 164 Id. at 9. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id.  
 167 Id. 
 168 CPGs are “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and 
patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.” 
INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 8 
(Marilyn Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990). 
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identify optimum treatment choices that are derived from 
clinical outcomes and effectiveness research.169 CPGs reflect the 
“well-considered opinions of expert panels, based upon reviews 
of the best available data, as to how physicians should 
approach certain clinical problems.”170 The use of CPGs to guide 
clinical decision making will improve quality of care by the use 
of what are called “best practices”171 and will decrease costs 
through the use of less costly choices that result in the same or 
better outcomes as higher-cost alternatives.172  
1. Applying Steps One Through Three of Knowledge 
Translation Theory 
In order to specifically identify an initial set of CPGs 
that are appropriate to adopt into a particular practice context, 
the set of physicians who make up a specific practice group 
within a hospital should set up a working committee. The 
ultimate task of this working committee will be to propose to 
the entire practice group a set of CPGs that has been modified 
to fit the clinical care expectations of the practice group as a 
whole. An example would be a working committee of the 
cardiology practice group of a hospital which would likely start 
  
 169 Id. at 6.  
 170 Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: 
A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice guidelines, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 
1506 (1989). 
 171 Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care 
Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369, 390-91, 394 (1995); KIRK B. JOHNSON ET AL., AM. MED. 
ASS’N, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRACTICE PARAMETERS 1 (1990) (referring to CPGs as 
“practice parameters” to guide physicians in “deliver[ing] high quality medical care in a 
fashion that is effective and efficient, thereby enabling the profession to respond to 
society’s need to assure appropriate utilization of health care services and to control 
health care expenditures without sacrificing quality of care.”); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT 
REVIEW COMM’N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 219-20 & n.1 (recommending 
federal support for outcome research and creation of practice guidelines based thereon); 
see also generally Robert H. Brook et al., Predicting the Appropriate Use of Carotid 
Endarterectomy, Upper Gastrointestinal Endoscopy, and Coronary Angiography, 323 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1173 (1990); David M. Eddy, Clinical Decision Making: From 
Theory to Practice, 263 JAMA 287, 287 (1990) (explaining the challenge that led to the 
best practices initiatives); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: 
The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777 (1990); Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn D. 
Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malpractice Environment: Problems 
and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 424-27 (1989); Leahy, supra note 170; 
William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and 
Improve Health Care, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1198 (1988) (describing what will 
later be labeled as a “best practices” initiative as an “effectiveness initiative” on the 
part of the Health Care Financing Administration); Steve Berman et al., Foreword, in 
Symposium, Getting It Right: The Makings of Practice Guidelines, 16 QUALITY REV. 
BULL., Feb. 1990, at 40. 
 172 Rosoff, supra note 171, at 370. 
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with the CPGs promulgated by the American College of 
Cardiology (ACC).173 The CPG working committee would first 
evaluate these CPGs,174 taking into consideration the 
suggestions of the entire practice group regarding modification 
of these CPGs to fit the collective practice style and 
professional judgments of all of the physicians in the practice 
group. The process of soliciting modifications will include 
educating the entire group regarding the merits (the strength 
of the science and the impact on quality) of each CPG at issue. 
Once these group suggestions are integrated into the CPGs, the 
working committee will then recommend them to the entire 
group for adoption.175  
  
 173 There are two main questions which a CPG committee should investigate 
when choosing the appropriate CPGs. First, who created the CPGs? And second, what 
scientific methods were used in the creation of the CPG? It is advisable for physicians 
to rely upon CPGs created by groups with “auspice legitimacy”—in other words, those 
developers with excellent reputations for accuracy and technical expertise. Id. at 384-
85. These are most likely to be large national groups which represent practice 
specialties, such as the ACC or the American Heart Association. It is also 
recommended that physicians avoid CPGs promulgated by payors, referred to by some 
as “boundary guidelines.” Boundary guidelines “are used by payors to define a range of 
practice options within which physicians could act without incurring financial or other 
sanctions.” Havighurst, supra note 171, at 778 n.3 (citing L. LEWIN & J.E. ERIKSON, 
LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES: THE ROLE OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS 3 (rev. ed. 1989) (prepared for the Physician 
Payment Review Commission’s Conference on Practice Guidelines, Washington, D.C., 
Oct. 11, 1988)). These CPGs are based on cost/benefit choices motivated by profit. CPGs 
that call for the provision of less care could increase the risk of malpractice exposure.  
 174 In addition, the CPG committee must evaluate the scientific basis for the 
CPG in great detail. Was the patient population that made up the clinical practice data 
base sufficiently large? Were the results grounded on well-accepted scientific outcomes 
research? Were the methodologies used appropriate for the context and were they used 
under the guidance of qualified medical professionals? If any of these questions are 
answered in the negative, the CPG should be avoided. On the other hand, if the CPG 
was created to optimize quality of care by competent scientists based on careful 
analysis of an appropriately large data base and the results were controlled for 
confounding, bias and probability issues, the CPG could be a candidate for adoption 
taking into consideration the nature of the specific practice. Rosoff, supra note 171, at 
384-86, 388, 390.  
 175 The amount of time, duplication of effort, and expense associated with this 
CPG review enterprise is a legitimate criticism of this proposal. One solution to these 
concerns is to follow the lead of the institutional review boards (IRBs) of medical institutions 
which conduct multicenter trials during clinical investigations of drugs and devices. 
[S]ometimes the IRB at each center of a multicenter trial conducts a complete 
review of the protocol and informed consent. Such multiple reviews by multiple 
IRBs can result in unnecessary duplication of effort, delays, and increased expenses 
in the conduct of multicenter clinical trials. Greater reliance on a centralized IRB 
review process, in appropriate circumstances, could reduce IRB burdens and delays 
in the conduct of multicenter trials. 
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY USING A CENTRALIZED IRE 
REVIEW PROCESS IN MULTICENTER CLINICAL TRIALS (Mar. 2006), at Part II, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm127013.pdf. For 
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Thus, steps one through three of knowledge translation 
theory will have been applied: this initial committee will have 
specifically identified the problem (the particular instances of 
conflict between treatment choices suggested by customary 
practice versus evidence-based practice), will have identified, 
reviewed, and selected the knowledge to implement (which 
CPGs to adopt), and will have adapted or customized the 
knowledge (the CPG) to the local context.  
2. Applying Steps Four Through Seven of Knowledge 
Translation Theory 
Once the adoption of the initial set of CPGs has been 
completed, a CPG committee would be appointed on a yearly 
basis which could review and update the guidelines. Whenever 
ACC (or another appropriate group that has auspice 
authenticity176) distributes new CPG provisions or revisions of 
existing CPGs, the CPG committee could make 
recommendations to the cardiology practice group for adoption 
(with or without revision) or rejection.  
Once the CPGs are adopted by the practice group, each 
physician who is a member of that department will be expected 
to comply with the CPGs except in situations where, in the 
judgment of the physician, they are not appropriate.177 In those 
  
example, central IRBs have been created to review multicenter trials dealing with a 
particular type of condition. “[T]he National Cancer Institute . . . has created a 
freestanding central IRB . . . to provide the option for centralized IRB review for the 
many multicenter cancer trials conducted by NCI.” Id. at Part VII.B. Similarly, CPG 
committees with comparable practice specialties could contract with a centralized CPG 
review group to perform a continuous review of CPGs to reflect scientific developments. 
The recommendations of this centralized CPG group could then be submitted to the 
CPG committee of the local institution for adoption, adoption with modification, or 
rejection. This pooling of resources is one way to deal with the concerns of duplication 
of effort, delay, and expense. 
 176 See Rosoff, supra note 171, at 384-95.  
 177 As Professor Rosoff explains:  
The goal of . . . CPGs is not, despite what some physicians may believe, to remove all 
elements of discretion and professional judgment from medical care. There will 
always be the need and, one would hope, the latitude-for the exercise of professional 
judgment. Still, as the body of what is knowable and what is known grows, the 
degree of latitude will inevitably be impacted by the extant knowledge base. When 
one does not know what is right or wrong, everything is fair game to do. Knowledge 
brings limitations, or at least, the basis for limitations to be imposed. As an Institute 
of Medicine committee on Practice Guidelines has stated, the formal recognition of 
the practice guidelines movement “can be seen as part of a significant cultural shift, 
a move away from unexamined reliance on professional judgment toward more 
structured support and accountability for such judgment. 
Id. at 375. 
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circumstances, the physician will be expected to engage in 
documentation of the reasons for deviating from the CPGs. A 
physician who fails to comply with the CPGs without a well-
documented rationale should be subject to corrective action.  
This process fits with the paternalistic libertarian 
theory advanced by Harvard Professor Cass Sunstein and 
University of Chicago Professor Richard Thaler, which starts 
with a default position based upon empirical evidence of best 
practices but then allows for individual choice in deviating 
from this default if it is reasonable to do so.178 What this system 
does not allow for is an irrational choice or an “unthinking” 
choice to deviate from the norm without careful consideration. 
Just as with crossing a street, when a reasonable person should 
“stop, look, and listen,” the CPGs ask physicians to stop, think, 
and make a rational choice to accept or reject the CPG. Then, 
these physicians must document their reason for a choice to reject 
the CPG, which creates data for review by risk management.  
In the area of scientific uncertainty, where one size does 
not fit all and the art of medicine must come into play, the 
paternalistic libertarian model works well. It allows for a 
starting point in the decision-making tree that is based on 
empirical data for the treatment of “norm,” with the freedom to 
make a different choice if reasonable.  
To keep the CPGs from falling behind current best 
practices, the cardiology CPG committee should perform 
updates on an ongoing basis to keep pace with scientific 
developments. The CPGs adopted by the cardiology practice 
group would then become the practice norm for all of the 
cardiology practice group’s physicians. Data should be gathered 
by the risk management department on the actual 
implementation of the CPGs. If a CPG was not followed, 
  
 178 Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2003).  
The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both 
possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while 
also respecting freedom of choice. Often people’s preferences are ill-formed, and their 
choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting 
points. In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped 
with an understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded 
self control, libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people’s choices in 
welfare promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice. It is also 
possible to show how a libertarian paternalist might select among the possible 
options and to assess how much choice to offer. Examples are given from many 
areas, including savings behavior, labor law, and consumer protection. 
Id.  
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collecting information on the reasons why the CPG was not 
followed will allow for further modifications to fit the needs of 
the practice and its patients. Fine tuning the CPG in this way 
will improve adherence to the CPG.  
Thus, steps four through seven of knowledge translation 
theory will have been applied. Pursuant to step four, a 
continuous assessment will be made by risk management of the 
determinants of knowledge use (when the CPGs have been 
followed or not, and why). Pursuant to step five, if further 
education regarding the CPGs is needed, problem solving can 
be done and strategies for teaching can be created by the 
cardiology CPG committee in conjunction with risk 
management. Thus, a continuing assessment of the success in 
implementing the CPGs and their impact on healthcare quality 
and cost can be made, fulfilling the requirements of steps six 
through seven for translating knowledge into action.  
3. A Working Example of the Application of Knowledge 
Translation Theory 
The prescription of aspirin after a heart attack provides 
a simple example of how this process will work. Scientific 
studies have long established that providing aspirin to a 
patient within twenty-four hours of a heart attack may 
increase that patient’s chances of survival by thirty percent.179 
Yet fifty percent of physicians in hospitals across the country 
are failing to provide this simple, lifesaving treatment.180 Under 
this proposal, the CPG committees of all of the hospital 
cardiology departments across the country should propose that 
the CPG of the American College of Cardiology181 recommending 
this treatment be adopted as an expectation of performance of 
the medical staff of each hospital’s cardiology department.  
To provide an example of how the exception to following 
the CPG would work, if this CPG on aspirin treatment for 
heart attack victims has been adopted and a heart attack 
patient is admitted to the hospital with a condition that 
contradicts the provision of this treatment, the physician must 
document this fact. Otherwise, the failure to provide the 
  
 179 Fessenden, supra note 23. 
 180 Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1245. 
 181 The ACC/AHA Guidelines for the Management of Patients with Acute 
Myocardial Infarction, and updates to the guidelines, are published in the Journal of the 
American College of Cardiology, 28 AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1328, 1374-76 (1996); 34 AM. C. 
CARDIOLOGY 890, 890-911 (1999) (updates), available at http://coment.onlinejacc.org/.  
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treatment will violate the performance expectation as set forth 
in the adopted CPG. This documentation exception should 
avoid a rigid expectation that the CPG be followed in all 
circumstances. It recognizes that patient care does not always 
follow the norm and allows for flexibility to adjust to a patient’s 
unique needs.  
This exception also allows for the high level of scientific 
uncertainty that exists currently when it comes to many 
medical conditions, particularly in the realm of the treatment 
of outliers. As the practice of evidence-based medicine (also 
known as population-based medicine or the treatment of 
“norm”) grows through the greater understanding of optimal 
treatment choices through big data techniques to establish 
comparative effectiveness—and later transitions to 
personalized medicine based on the treatment of individuals 
according to their unique genetic profiles—the currently high 
degree of scientific uncertainly will steadily diminish and 
reduce the use of this exception. 
This committee system will allow for physician choice 
among CPGs182 which will then suggest treatment choices based 
on best outcomes derived from empirical studies.183 An example of 
how this is already being done is the integrated practice model 
adopted by the Mayo Clinic184 and the VA Hospital System.185  
CONCLUSION 
As pointed out in this article, a large and rapidly 
growing group of empirical studies suggests that the current 
normative practice of custom-based medicine in the United 
States has a negative impact on the quality and cost of 
healthcare. The quality and cost problems with the customary 
care model have led to a national push to move the United 
  
 182 Clinical Practice Guidelines are based on empirical data generated by 
clinical outcomes and effectiveness research which suggests the optimum treatment for 
a rapidly growing number of clinical conditions. Leahy, supra note 170, at 1506.  
 183 Id. This use of empirical data generated through scientific methodology to 
make medical decisions shows great promise for enhancing quality of care while 
decreasing the cost of care. Van Tassel, supra note 3, at 1245.  
 184 See DOUGLAS MCCARTHY ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUB. NO. 1306, 
MAYO CLINIC: MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAMWORK, PHYSICIAN-LED GOVERNANCE, AND 
PATIENT-CENTERED CULTURE DRIVE WORLD-CLASS HEALTH CARE 13 (2009), available at 
http://www.commonwealth.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Case%20Study/2009/Aug/1306
_McCarthy_Mayo_case%20study.pdf (describing the structural and cultural pillars 
undergirding the Mayo Clinic’s integrated model of health care delivery). 
 185 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
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States to a modern, evidence-based model of medical practice 
through major changes in government-provided healthcare.  
However, the three main systems already in place for 
improving healthcare in the United States are encouraging the 
perpetuation of custom-based practices undermining the 
national efforts to improve the quality and cost of healthcare 
through the practice of evidence-based treatment choices. This 
article’s specific suggestions for how these systems can be 
modified to work in tandem with federal law will encourage 
physicians to adopt the evidence-based model of medical practice 
in order to improve healthcare quality, cost, and access.  
